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Subj: COMMAND INSPECTION OF NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND,
30 NOVEMBER TO 11 DECEMBER 2015

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A
(b) SECNAVINST 5430.57G

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINGEN) conducts command inspections of echelon 2 commands to provide the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations with a firsthand assessment of Departmental risks and major issues relevant to policy, management, and direction as directed by reference (a). Reference (b) tasks NAVINGEN with conducting inspections and surveys, making appropriate evaluations and recommendations concerning operating forces afloat and ashore, Department of the Navy components and functions, and Navy programs that impact readiness or quality of life for military and civilian naval personnel.
2. NAVINGEN conducted a Command Inspection of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) from 30 November to 11 December 2015. This report documents our findings.
3. This report contains an Executive Summary, our observations and findings, and documented deficiencies noted during the inspection. A summary of survey and focus group data, as well as a complete listing of survey frequency data is included.
4. During our visit, we assessed NAVSEA's overall mission readiness in the execution of its echelon 2 responsibilities; functions and tasks as assigned in or defined by OPNAVINST 5450.340, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command of 7 September 2010; and other laws, policy, and regulations. We assessed administrative programs, facilities, safety and environmental compliance, security programs, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life and home life for Navy military and civilian personnel.
5. Our overall assessment is that NAVSEA is effectively executing its complex mission as the Navy's largest acquisition command. NAVSEA demonstrates a good understanding and balance in the planning and execution of this broad array of functions. We found a dedicated and professional staff committed to mission accomplishment under challenging fiscal realities and increasing congressional scrutiny of our nation's investments in the Navy.

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6. Corrective actions

a. NAVINSGEN identified 138 deficiencies that require NAVSEA's corrective action. Programs include: Equal Employment Opportunity Program, information technology acquisition, military and civilian training, Information Security, Personnel Security, Industrial Security, Physical Security/Antiterrorism and Force Protection, Operations Security, Cybersecurity, Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Intelligence Oversight, Inspector General Functions, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, Personal Property Management, Records Management, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR), Suicide Prevention, Transition Assistance Management Program (TAMP), Voting Assistance, and Command Indoctrination.

b. Additionally, NAVINSGEN provided NAVSEA with 64 separate recommendations for consideration, relating to organization structure, manning/manpower, contracting, budget submission functions, human resources, training, safety, overseas drinking water, security, PII, research technology protection, intelligence support and oversight, FOIA, records management, SAPR, suicide prevention, and TAMP.

c. This report includes six issue papers that require action by NAVSEA. Appendix A: Issue Papers provides detailed guidance on how to report completion of recommendations identified in the issue paper.

d. Correction of each deficiency and adoption of each recommendation, and a description of action(s) taken or rationale of why recommendations were not adopted, should be reported via Implementation Status Report (ISR), OPNAV 5040/2 by NAVSEA no later than 1 October 2016. Deficiencies not corrected by this date or requiring longer-term solutions should be updated quarterly until completed.

7. My point of contact is

b6,b7c,k2



HERMAN A. SHELANSKI

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30 NOVEMBER TO 11 DECEMBER 2015

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**NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMAND INSPECTION OF
COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
30 NOVEMBER - 11 DECEMBER 2015**

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Executive Summary

The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a command inspection of Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) from 30 November to 11 December 2015. Our last inspection of NAVSEA was in 2010. The team was augmented with subject matter experts, including personnel from the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy (DUSN(P)); Health Services; the Office of Naval Research (ONR); Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC); Naval Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN); Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR); Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC); Military Sealift Command (MSC); Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); Navy Medicine Information Systems Support Activity (NAVMISSA); Defense Health Agency (DHA); the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS); and the Office of Civilian Human Resources (OCHR).

During our visit, we assessed NAVSEA's overall mission readiness in the execution of its echelon 2 responsibilities; functions and tasks as assigned in or defined by OPNAVINST 5450.340, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command of 7 September 2010; and other laws, policy, and regulations. We assessed administrative programs, facilities, safety and environmental compliance, security programs, and Sailor programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of work life (QOWL) and home life (QOHL) for Navy military and civilian personnel.

It was clear by the issue papers NAVSEA submitted prior to the inspection that the Commander and senior leaders had conducted self-assessments and were aware of many of the area and program deficiencies and issues that were identified during the command inspection. In some instances, the NAVSEA staff self-reported deficiencies contained in this report.

MISSION PERFORMANCE

NAVSEA's mission is shipbuilding and weapon system acquisition, life cycle support, and disposal. Unique responsibilities include serving as the "executive manager" for explosive ordnance disposal and technology for the Department of Defense (DoD); the single technical authority and systems command (SYSCOM) point of contact for explosive safety; the lead SYSCOM for theater nuclear warfare, security and safety of nuclear weapons, and matters relating to physical security of conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives; and providing all technical and administrative support pertaining to diving and salvage for the Navy. NAVINSGEN did not inspect missions associated with the Navy's nuclear propulsion program and related duties regarding nuclear power.

Our overall assessment is that NAVSEA is effectively executing its complex mission as the Navy's largest acquisition command. NAVSEA demonstrates a good understanding and balance in the planning and execution of this broad array of functions. We found a dedicated and professional staff committed to mission accomplishment under challenging fiscal realities and increasing congressional scrutiny of our nation's investments in the Navy.

Missions, Functions, and Tasks

OPNAVINST 5450.340 has not been updated in the last three years, as required by OPNAVINST 5400.44A, Navy Organization Change Manual. NAVSEA submitted an updated missions, functions, and tasks (MFT) to OPNAV for approval in November 2015. NAVSEA is effectively performing its MFT related to explosive ordnance disposal, ship repair, diving and salvage, ship and weapon system acquisition, budget submission, PEO support and management, and field activity oversight of MFT functions.

Organization Structure

NAVSEA's organizational structure is necessarily complicated given the size and scope of their mission. They are organized into numbered Directorates based on competency areas, groupings of responsibilities, or field activities. As tasked by OPNAVINST 5450.340 and codified through the Joint Memorandum, Subj: Naval Warfare and Systems Centers Acceptance and Assignment of Work, NAVSEA provides specific competency support to Program Executive Office (PEO) Ships, Littoral Combat Ships, Submarines, Carriers, and Integrated Warfare Systems.

NAVSEA headquarters personnel and PEOs employ a strong "team" concept to meet its complex set of mission priorities. This team concept (i.e. Team Ships, Team Subs, etc.) provides enhanced synergy, closes seams between multiple levels in the chain of command, and enables the ability to monitor cradle-to-grave lifecycles of platforms and systems.

Manning/Manpower

Current and planned DoD Major Headquarters Activities (MHA) reductions have negatively impacted NAVSEA's ability to execute assigned missions, functions, and tasks as identified by noted deficiencies. NAVSEA initially reported program management personnel (in addition to their headquarters personnel) in their MHA total of over 3,335 full-time equivalents (FTEs), resulting in a planned reduction of the civilian budget by 667 FTE. NAVSEA updated MHA FTE totals (subtracting PEO and subordinate warfare center command personnel); their MHA FTE total is now 546. NAVSEA is requesting restoration of a portion of the 667 FTE reductions in line with this new, more accurate MHA FTE total.

Shore Manpower Requirements Determination

NAVSEA has not completed a Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD), as required by OPNAVINST 1000.16L CH-1, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures. Without an SMRD, it is difficult to analyze the projected impact of the MHA reductions.

Civilian Human Resources

NAVSEA human resources (HR) staff is not organized in accordance with SECNAVINST 12250.6A, Civilian Human Resources Management in the Department of the Navy. Employment of unauthorized HR "shadow" staffs exist throughout program offices. The classification of positions performing substantive HR work in series outside the GS-0200 occupational family and the assignment of substantive HR functions to positions classified outside of the GS-0200 occupational series is prohibited per SECNAVINST 12250.6A. Additionally, we reviewed Defense

Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) designated positions and observed position descriptions that were absent acquisition responsibilities. We recommend that OCHR conduct a Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework visit and a personnel records “deep dive” to identify HR “shadow” staff functions and also, every NAVSEA headquarters position that is identified as an acquisition position should be verified as being assigned and performing acquisition responsibilities.

The Interim Personnel Management System (IPMS) is not compliant with Department of the Navy (DON) Civilian Human Resources Manual, Subchapter 430.1, paragraph 6b and 6c2b, DON Performance Management Programs. A review of a random sample of fiscal year (FY) 2014 DON interim performance appraisal forms found untimely execution of IPMS requirements of NAVSEA headquarters civilian employee performance plans, progress reviews, and annual appraisals.

The NAVSEA Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program is not fully compliant. EEO complaint processing timelines exceed requirements as outlined in 29 CFR part 1614 and EEO Management Directive MD-110.

Acquisition and Commonality

The NAVSEA Acquisition and Commonality Directorate was established in 2014 to advance common acquisition and variance reduction policies and processes to enable programs to deliver affordable, reliable, and mission-supporting ships and weapons systems. While this directorate is still maturing, the establishment of a commonality goal across platforms shows great promise for reducing costs, schedules, and program complexities, and is worthy of continued emphasis and support from NAVSEA and resource sponsor leadership.

Head Contracting Agent Function

NAVSEA has a technically proficient contract team that produces high-quality contracts; however, they do not have the capability to meet the heavy contracting workload demand due in large measure to human resource constraints. NAVSEA has an increasing workload backlog causing persistent contracting delays that negatively impact mission accomplishment. We observed that the contract delays rest not only with the contracting office, but are exacerbated by emergent contracting requirements and the quality of some of the documentation provided by program offices. We observed that with strong command leadership support, the NAVSEA contracting directorate was authorized to increase FTEs in a phased approach to address the persistent contracting backlog.

Information Technology Acquisition

NAVSEA's information technology (IT) acquisition is not compliant with governing directives. NAVSEA IT acquisition personnel have not completed DAWIA certification, as required by DoD 5000.52-M, Acquisition Career Development Program. The command has not performed the required IT inventory and does not fully track assets in the Accountable Property System of Record, as required by SECNAVINST 5200.42, Accountability and Management of Department of the Navy Property. Furthermore, NAVSEA is operating legacy networks without the

approved authorities to operate required by DoDI 8510.01, Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT).

Strategic Planning

NAVSEA has a clearly articulated vision; simply stated, "It's all about the Ships." Members of the command clearly understand how this vision translates to their individual work. NAVSEA's Strategic Business Plan is well written and builds on the vision providing broad direction to the headquarters workforce and the entire NAVSEA enterprise. The NAVSEA business strategy is intrinsically aligned to optimize organizational structures for execution and to capitalize on selected Strategic Business Plan focus areas and objectives.

Military and Civilian Training

NAVSEA has not completed mandatory training requirements for military and civilians. The command was unable to provide FY14 military training completion metrics in accordance with governing directives.

General Military Training

General Military Training (GMT) is not completed by all military personnel as directed by OPNAVINST 1500.22G, General Military Training, and NAVADMIN 386/11 and 264/13, General Military Training and FY15 General Military Training Schedule, respectively. FY15 GMT completion rate was 60 percent (Category 1 topics) and 73 percent (Category 2 topics) vice the required 100 percent.

Civilian Training

Civilian training requirements are not completed as directed by SECNAVINST 12410.25, Civilian Employee Training and Career Development, and the OCHR mandatory training requirements. NAVSEA's overall FY15 civilian training completion rate was 79 percent. Supervisors of civilian employees FY15 training completion rate was 23 percent.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

NAVSEA is effectively executing shore related mission requirements with respect to facilities, environmental, and energy conservation, as well as specific responsibilities regarding explosive safety. NAVSEA Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Programs meet most required elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policy.

NAVSEA's Spill Preparedness and Response Program is professional, well organized, and well equipped. Their planning and exercise regimen has produced a historically high-performing team that was specifically requested to assist with cleanup of the New Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

NAVSEA has implemented safety program reviews of the four public shipyards. This is an extremely methodical and repeatable process to assess safety program performance, as well as the safety culture.

Cross-functional Failure Review Boards are NAVSEA's integrated engineering and safety analysis of incidents to discern root cause and effect substantive change.

Facilities

NAVSEA has a facilities division to manage space utilization in their buildings, and a NAVSEA trouble desk to liaise with the Public Works Department and track maintenance of these buildings. NAVSEA's space allocation database is accurate and well maintained; we consider this tool a best practice, as it can be used to create plans to relocate individuals or groups of employees into, out of, or within NAVSEA assigned spaces smoothly and efficiently while maintaining accurate records of employee location. We noted sound oversight and direction of NAVSEA enterprise infrastructure requirements; echelon 3 and below requirements are captured in the annual Shipyard Infrastructure Board and Warfare Center Infrastructure Board, which are then consolidated, prioritized, and briefed to the NAVSEA Commander.

Safety and Occupational Health

NAVSEA SOH Programs meet most required elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policy. Prior to this inspection, the NAVSEA SEA 04RS Safety Manager provided its program assessment that identified many of the deficiencies noted in the body of the report.

Environmental Readiness

NAVSEA is compliant with federal statutes and regulations, DON governing instructions and policies, OPNAVINST 5090.1D, Environmental Readiness Program Manual, and NAVSEA's own instructions and policies. NAVSEA executes a strong and well-organized environmental program, providing effective oversight of subordinate activities with respect to environmental compliance programs. We noted a particularly strong Spill Preparedness and Response Program, as well as sound execution of National Environmental Policy Act requirements.

Overseas Drinking Water Program

Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) on Andros Island, Bahamas, is under NAVSEA control and was recently added to the Overseas Drinking Water (ODW) Program as a covered system in September 2015. While a reverse osmosis treatment plant provides drinking water for residents and employees onboard AUTEC, this system does not yet have a Certificate to Operate and thus does not comply with governing instructions. We note that State of Florida public drinking water standards had been used in the past as criteria for annual sanitary surveys of this drinking water system, and NAVSEA is actively working to meet governing ODW instructions. A Sanitary Survey of AUTEC's ODW system is planned for September 2016.

Energy Conservation

NAVSEA is compliant with SECNAVINST 4101.3, Department of the Navy Energy Program for Security and Independence Roles and Responsibilities, and OPNAVINST 4100.5E, Shore Energy Management. Furthermore, NAVSEA provides sound oversight and guidance of operational energy programs to subordinate echelons; however, we note that OPNAV N45 has been working to provide a detailed Operational Energy instruction for several years, as DoD and DON guidance is general in nature.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

A holistic security review is required in order to develop an integrated plan to correct the various programs. The recent elevation of the Security Directorate to report directly to the Chief of Staff will provide increased visibility by the front office on security and will remove previous barriers between the Commander and the Security Manager. Projected MHA reductions will exacerbate the challenges already being experienced by the Security Directorate.

Insider Threat

The day-to-day security performance, program compliance, and physical security readiness has challenges. The September 2013 active shooter incident highlighted the danger posed by an Insider Threat. NAVSEA made significant efforts to reconstitute its workforce into the refurbished headquarters building. However, it needs to establish integrated processes and procedures, and equip itself with the required tools to effectively identify and counter insider threats.

Information Security

Information Security is not fully compliant with SECNAV M5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Program. NAVSEA has not performed required annual self-inspections of its Information Security Program since 2010 and has not conducted required inventories of its Top Secret holdings for 23 months. [REDACTED] b7e

Personnel Security

Personnel Security is not fully compliant with SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program. NAVSEA has not performed required annual self-inspections of its program since 2010 and does not have a formal method to ensure all IT personnel at NAVSEA headquarters and across the enterprise have the correct background investigations.

Industrial Security

Industrial Security is not fully compliant with SECNAV M5510.36. NAVSEA does not have codified Industrial Security procedures and policy in place.

Physical Security/Antiterrorism and Force Protection

Physical Security/Antiterrorism and Force Protection Programs [REDACTED] b7e
[REDACTED] b7e as required by OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2), Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command Shore Protection Program Manual. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED] . Based on a review of 5 separate physical security-related reviews and investigations of NAVSEA since 2009, we found at least 10 repeat findings that have not been corrected. [REDACTED] b7e

b7e

and

NAVSEA does not have a formal Key and Lock Control Program.

Operations Security

Operations Security (OPSEC) is not compliant with OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Operations Security. NAVSEA lacks a Commander-approved Critical Information List, as required by DoD 5205.02-M, DoD Operations Security Manual, and OPNAVINST 3432.1A, and does not review contracts for OPSEC.

Cybersecurity

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Personnel outside the Chief Information Officer's office are performing privileged user (IT Level 1) functions without required certifications or agreements on file.

Personally Identifiable Information

The Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Program

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as required by SECNAVINST 5211.5E, Department of the Navy Privacy Program.

Intelligence Oversight

Intelligence Oversight (IO) is not fully compliant. The NAVSEA Senior Intelligence Officer/Scientific and Technical Intelligence Liaison Officer has not fully implemented procedures to identify and vet IO concerns properly within the scope of its intelligence related activities.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

NAVSEA's Compliance Programs are effective and executed in accordance with governing instructions, with the exception of the following programs that were assessed as not compliant or not fully compliant.

Inspector General Functions

The NAVSEA Hotline Program is not in compliance with SECNAVINST 5370.5B, DON Hotline Program. Timelines for NAVSEA's Hotline Program preliminary inquiries, referrals and dismissals, and full investigations are not being met.

Freedom of Information Act

The NAVSEA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program is not compliant due to a very large backlog of nearly 500 FOIA requests. NAVSEA headquarters receives 15 to 20 new FOIA requests per week, with most relating to contracts that are usually large, require subject matter expertise to prepare responses, and require coordination with contractors.

Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention

The Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program is not fully compliant. The NAVSEA Alcohol Drug Control Officer (ADCO) is a collateral duty. The OPNAVINST 5350.4D, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, requires that individuals assigned as the ADCO should serve in this capacity as their primary duty.

Personal Property Management

NAVSEA is not compliant with DoD and DON personal property policies and procedures. NAVSEA provided no objective evidence that the command has had an active headquarters Personal Property Program since 2013.

Records Management

NAVSEA's Records Management Program is not fully compliant. Long delays in updating the Command Document Management System have created a culture of non-compliance for the retention and preservation of electronic record material.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program at NAVSEA is not fully compliant. We found that the command is committed to maintaining an environment free of sexual assault and to ensuring that victims would receive excellent care and support services. SAPR training for military and civilians who supervise service members was not completed as required by DoDI 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures.

Suicide Prevention

The NAVSEA Suicide Prevention Program is not fully compliant. Contrary to OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program, NAVSEA does not have a crisis intervention plan, has not designated an Assistant Suicide Prevention Coordinator, has not provided program oversight of subordinate commands, and did not conduct suicide training in FY14. As of December 2015, less than 1 percent of the civilian staff had completed required training.

Transition Assistance

The NAVSEA Transition Assistance Management Program is not fully compliant. There were no documented Pre-Separation Counseling Checklists (DD Form 2648) or Service Member's Individual Transition Plan Checklists (DD form 2958) in the Defense Manpower Data Center, as required by the Veteran's Opportunity to Work to Hire Heroes Act of 2011. NAVSEA did not maintain paper copies of DD Form 2648s on file for two years, as required by OPNAVINST 1900.2B, Transition Assistance Management Program.

Voting Assistance

The NAVSEA's Voting Assistance Program is not fully compliant with DoDI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program. Contrary to DoDI 1000.04, NAVSEA has only one unit voting officer. In addition, NAVSEA has not established and maintained a required standard e-mail address.

SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

Our survey and focus groups discussions found that QOWL and QOHL at NAVSEA are higher than the historical echelon 2 command averages. Leadership, parking, and Internet/corporate tools are perceived to impact the mission, job performance, and quality of life most adversely; telework is perceived as a positive impact. Rated on a 10-point scale, the NAVSEA QOWL and QOHL are 6.81 and 8.34, respectively; the corresponding echelon 2 command historical averages are 6.67 and 7.95. Specific comments from focus groups and surveys were passed to NAVSEA leadership and are included in Appendices B and C.

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Areas/Programs Assessed

- **Mission Performance**
 - Systems Command Function
 - Manning/Manpower
 - Ship and Weapon System Acquisition/Program Executive Office Support and Management
 - Head Contracting Agent Function
 - Budget Submission Function
 - Field Activity Oversight
 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 - Ship Repair
 - Diving and Salvage
 - Information Technology Acquisition
 - Strategic Planning
 - Continuity of Operations Program
 - Civilian Human Resources
 - Equal Employment Opportunity
 - Military/Civilian Training
- **Facilities, Environmental, and Safety**
 - Facilities Management
 - Safety and Occupational Health
 - Environmental Readiness
 - Overseas Drinking Water Program
 - Energy Conservation
- **Security Programs and Cybersecurity/Technology**
 - Command Security
 - Insider Threat
 - Information Security
 - Personnel Security
 - Industrial Security
 - Physical Security/Antiterrorism Force Protection
 - Special Security Programs
 - Operations Security
 - Counterintelligence Training and Support
 - Cybersecurity
 - Personally Identifiable Information
 - Foreign Disclosure
 - Research Technology Protection
 - Intelligence Support to Acquisition
 - Intelligence Oversight

- **Resource Management/Compliance Programs**
 - Inspector General Functions
 - Freedom of Information Act
 - Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention
 - Personal Property Management
 - Records Management
 - Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
 - Suicide Prevention
 - Transition Assistance
 - Voting Assistance
- **Sailor Programs**
 - Command Sponsorship
 - Command Indoctrination
 - Career Development Board
 - Sailor Recognition Program
 - CPO 365
 - NAVSEA Senior Enlisted Training Symposium

Observations and Findings

MISSION PERFORMANCE

The Mission Performance Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, group discussions, and face-to-face interviews to gather information and assess mission performance of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). These findings apply to the functions and tasks as assigned in or defined by OPNAVINST 5450.340, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, dated 07 September 2010. At the time of the inspection, NAVSEA had submitted an updated MFT statement and was awaiting approval.

NAVSEA's mission is to provide material support to the Navy, Marine Corps, and other agencies as assigned for ships, submarines, and other sea platforms, shipboard combat systems and components, and other surface and undersea warfare and weapons systems and ordnance expendables not specifically assigned to other systems commands (SYSCOMs). They provide total system integration, systems engineering, contracting, administrative and technical support and guidance, and personnel and training support to the Navy, other military departments, and agencies and serve as the executive manager for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and technology for the Department of Defense (DoD). NAVSEA is the single technical authority and SYSCOM point of contact for explosive safety; and as the lead SYSCOM for theater nuclear warfare, security, and safety of nuclear weapons, and matters relating to physical security of conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives. The command is also tasked as the Navy coordinator of shipbuilding, conversion, and repair for the DoD, coordinator for ship repair and conversion for the Department of Commerce, and head of the joint Navy and Marine Assessment Research Division Design Team. NAVSEA provides all Navy technical and administrative support pertaining to diving and salvage and serves as the technical authority and operational safety and assurance certification authority for their assigned areas of responsibility.

Our overall assessment is that NAVSEA is effectively executing its complex mission as the Navy's largest acquisition command. We have identified a number of challenges facing NAVSEA, many of which they can correct themselves, but some of which will require outside assistance. We reviewed the following areas:

- Systems Command Function
- Manning/Manpower
- Ship and Weapon System Acquisition
- Relationship and Support of Program Executive Offices
- Head Contracting Agent Function
- Budget Submission Function
- Field Activity Oversight
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- Ship Repair
- Diving and Salvage

- Information Technology Acquisition
- Strategic Planning
- Continuity of Operations Program
- Office of Civilian Human Resources
- Equal Employment Opportunity
- Military/Civilian Training

Systems Command Functions

Organization Structure

NAVSEA's organizational structure is necessarily complicated given the size and scope of their mission. They are organized into numbered Directorates based on competency areas, groupings of responsibilities, or field activities. As tasked by OPNAVINST 5450.340 and codified through the Joint Memorandum, Subj: Naval Warfare and Systems Centers Acceptance and Assignment of Work, NAVSEA provides specific competency support to Program Executive Office (PEO) Ships, Littoral Combat Ships, Submarines, Carriers, and Integrated Warfare Systems. Figure 1 diagrams NAVSEA's organization as of November 2015.




Figure 1. Naval Sea Systems Command Organization Chart

In addition to supporting the program offices under the PEOs, NAVSEA has responsibility for program offices aligned under SEA 06 (Acquisition and Commonality), SEA 07 (Undersea Warfare), and SEA 21 (Surface Warfare). Among services provided, NAVSEA has responsibility for comptroller functions, contracting, fleet logistics and maintenance, engineering and test and evaluation (T&E) technical authority, and total force management.

NAVSEA has a strong teaming concept that spans across NAVSEA headquarters and the PEOs. Communication is excellent and numerous opportunities exist to share information and lessons learned with others in the organizations at the executive level and below. Among those efforts are the Cross-Functional Failure Review Board, which seeks to identify root causes of problems with fleet systems and identify corrections, and the T&E Functional Advisory Board that supports, maintains, strengthens, and promotes T&E practices.

While cross-organizational communication is excellent, there was no evidence of an active knowledge management or lessons-learned repository to permanently capture and share lessons for future use. There are proposals for a SEA 05 database to capture lessons learned that both the organization and the fleet could utilize, and a desire to translate T&E lessons learned into best practices and potential policy and/or changes to directives. There is no formal organizational support at this point; any effective knowledge management system must have leadership support to become institutionalized.

Recommendation 1. That NAVSEA establish a process and repository for capturing lessons learned.

Manning/Manpower

Current and future planned DoD Major Headquarters Activities (MHA) reductions have negatively impacted NAVSEA's ability to execute assigned missions, functions, and tasks as identified by noted deficiencies. NAVSEA initially reported program management personnel (in addition to their headquarters personnel) in their MHA total of over 3,335 full-time equivalents (FTEs), resulting in a planned reduction of the civilian budget by 667 FTE. NAVSEA updated MHA FTE totals (subtracting PEO and subordinate warfare center command personnel); their MHA FTE total is now 546. NAVSEA is requesting restoration of a portion of the 667 FTE reductions in line with this new, more accurate MHA FTE total.

During focus groups, employees reported heavy workloads and ever-increasing requirements that were negatively impacting the QOWL of the NAVSEA workforce. An indication of the significant workload NAVSEA employees face is the total of 102,000 hours of combined credit hours, compensatory time, and overtime earned, reported, and approved in FY15 for the NAVSEA headquarters and PEO employees. This equates to approximately 49-man years. On top of the reported compensation for working beyond established work hours, employees reported almost universally that dedicated civilian employees were consistently working more hours than they are compensated for to meet their work demands. The level of uncompensated work reported by NAVSEA personnel during our visit significantly exceeds what we have heard during our visits to other echelon 2 commands. MHA reductions, as currently

planned, will negatively impact the command's programmed workload and associated workforce beyond a moderate risk level.

NAVSEA can make great strides as model employer by the strategic management of human resources. Advanced technology, contract oversight, cybersecurity, and other complex NAVSEA functions have generated the need for a workforce with a more advanced education and greater technical skills. Exacerbating the problem of recruiting and retaining talent, NAVSEA competes for these more educated and technically skilled candidates with hiring tools and career paths that were designed to meet the position needs of the past. The command will need to utilize the Director, Civilian Human Resources' (DCHR) and Human Resources Office's (HRO) expertise by teaming with management to optimize the use of all existing recruitment and hiring authorities and flexibilities, and will need to market pay for performance as the command transitions to the acquisition demonstration project. A Human Capital Strategic Plan would assist the command with aligning workforce goals with mission execution.

Recommendation 2. That NAVSEA publish a Human Capital Strategic Plan.

Shore Manpower Requirements Determination

A Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) provides a systematic means of determining and documenting manpower requirements based on mission, functions, and tasks and projected personnel workloads. NAVSEA has not completed an SMRD, as required by OPNAVINST 1000.16L, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures. Without an SMRD, it is difficult to gauge the projected impact of MHA reductions accurately.

As an alternative to the SMRD, in 2013 NAVSEA began using their own Workload Demand Forecast Model (WDFM) to determine manpower requirements. While on the surface WDFM appears to be a valid method to determine required workforce levels, it will produce suboptimal results. The model is flawed since it depends on accurate data reflecting the hours the NAVSEA staff is working. Since most NAVSEA employees do not report all the hours they work, WDFM will consistently arrive at lower staffing levels than required by the mission. In order for the model to accurately predict required staffing levels, all hours worked by NAVSEA employees must be reported. This will require a culture change for the organization as well as additional funding as this will increase costs.

Recommendation 3. That NAVSEA conduct an SMRD or SMRD like assessment, after the pending MFT update is approved, as required by OPNAVINST 1000.16L, CH-1, Section 400, paragraph 5d and Section 402, paragraph 4b.

Ship and Weapon System Acquisition/PEO Support and Management

Per OPNAVINST 5450.340, NAVSEA is responsible for both non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs, as assigned, and oversight of the core processes required to support the acquisition, in-service support, weapon systems, IT, engineering systems, and affiliated PEO requirements to include:

- Realistic and reasonable cost estimating
- Technology development and technical readiness assessment
- Systems engineering (acquisition and in-service) and development, including environment, safety, and occupational health management
- Manufacturing
- Test and evaluation
- Integrated Logistics Systems (acquisition and in-service)
- Installation
- Maintenance and modernization planning
- Configuration management
- Demilitarization and disposal
- Comptroller, legal, contracting, and administrative support services

NAVSEA is effectively providing these services and is accomplishing its mission.

Team Concept

Although program offices under the PEOs do not technically fall under NAVSEA, there is a strong teaming concept within the larger NAVSEA enterprise that works well and promotes combined efforts across both development and in-service programs. Lack of consistency in oversight of delegated Milestone Decision Authority responsibilities was highlighted in Naval Audit Service report N2014-005, Naval Sea Systems Command and Affiliated Program Executive Offices' Management Oversight for Select Acquisition Category III and IV Programs, dated 19 December 2013. In response, NAVSEA recently approved an update to NAVSEAINST 5000.3F, Acquisition Program Review and Reporting, effective 28 September 2015, that enacts required program reviews that should correct the issue.

Engineering and Test and Evaluation

The Engineering and Test and Evaluation Directorate, SEA 05, has a robust system of Chief Systems Engineers and Technical Domain Managers who diligently maintain their independent technical authority and therefore provide technical realism and balance to their programs. T&E specialties are part of the larger engineering directorate and at times, this has resulted in a lack of operational perspective to test programs. The relatively recent addition of a T&E technical advisor to the directorate now provides an operational mission view during developmental testing, a positive change that should continue. We observed that within NAVSEA headquarters, there are limited T&E specific advancement opportunities; yet experienced test engineers are key to a robust, effective developmental test program. When NAVSEA shifted to a Competency Aligned Organization, T&E was not included as one of the major competencies and most people were placed in the Engineering career field. At the time of the inspection there were approximately 836 T&E career field personnel across the NAVSEA enterprise with 90 percent of those positions at the lower level warfare centers. Career enhanced training and rotational assignments are therefore limited at the headquarters level, which impacts succession planning within the headquarters staff. Generally the warrant holders at the headquarters level are subject matter experts on a specific area (i.e., surface weapon systems) and may have little T&E background.

Recommendation 4. That NAVSEA examine the feasibility of a T&E career field track.***Acquisition and Commonality***

The Acquisition and Commonality Directorate, SEA 06, was established in April 2014 to advance common acquisition and variance reduction policies and processes to enable programs to deliver affordable, reliable, and mission-supporting ships and weapons systems. SEA 06 has a dual role as the center for acquisition and commonality for the NAVSEA enterprise and specific Expeditionary Warfare/Ordnance acquisition programs. While the directorate is still maturing, the establishment of a commonality goal across platforms where applicable shows great promise for reducing cost, schedule, and program complexity across the enterprise and is worthy of continued emphasis and support from both NAVSEA and resource sponsor leadership.

Head Contracting Agent Function

In accordance with the Navy Marine Corp Acquisition Supplement (NMCARS), the NAVSEA Contracts Directorate (SEA 02) is the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA) for awarding and administering contracts for ships and submarines, assigned weapon systems and platforms, and relevant professional, research, and engineering services. SEA 02 is also responsible for awarding and administering contracts for construction, maintenance, and modernization of ships and submarines, nuclear propulsion, watercraft, submersibles, equipage for towing, diving and salvage, and University Affiliated Research Centers. In executing its HCA responsibilities, NAVSEA is in compliance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement, and the NMCARS. In addition, it is in compliance when executing its additional and/or more specific HCA responsibilities detailed in OPNAV Instruction 5450.340, which includes assigned weapons systems programs and PEO.

The HCA authority flows down from SEA 00 to SEA 02/02B through a delegation letter, and is further delegated to the four Procurement Divisions:

- SEA 022 - Shipbuilding Contracts Division
- SEA 024 - Fleet Support Contract Division
- SEA 025 - Surface Systems Contract Division
- SEA 026 - Undersea Systems Contract Division

HCA authority is further delegated to the Field Procurement Offices (FPO) under the four Procurement Divisions. FPOs include the SUPSHIP offices, regional maintenance centers, naval shipyards, naval surface warfare centers, and naval undersea warfare centers.

The Contract Divisions provide contracting support and expertise to PEO Ships, PEO Littoral Combat Ships, PEO Submarines, PEO Carriers, and PEO Integrated Warfare Systems. The PEOs are responsible for creating and maintaining the milestones for the major systems required to be reported to ASN(RD&A).

SEA 02 uses the SeaPort Enhanced (SeaPort-e) program's milestone tool to establish and track procurement milestones throughout the entire process, including the development of the requirements package, acceptance of the procurement request, the award by quarter and fiscal year, and backlog, if required. SeaPort-e specifies responsibilities for the fulfillment of each milestone, ensures key approvals are obtained, and tracks employee turnover, as staffing has been a challenge for the past several years. SeaPort-e does not have a method to track or measure customer feedback, which could prove to be valuable as they frequently assess backlog reduction goals.

In accordance with NMCARS Subpart 5201.691, Procurement Management Oversight, a Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) review of NAVSEA was conducted in 2012 by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Procurement. Overall, the NAVSEA contracts organization was found to be well managed and to have a satisfactory internal PPMAP Program, with no repeat findings.

NAVSEA has a technically proficient contract team that produces high-quality contracts; however, they do not have adequate staffing to meet the heavy contracting workload. NAVSEA contracting has an increasing workload backlog causing persistent contracting delays that are negatively impacting mission accomplishment. Without mitigation, the backlog is anticipated to reach 436 new contracting actions by 2020. This does not include post-award contract administration, which makes up approximately 32 percent of the contracting demand signal. Based on data shown in Figure 2, NAVSEA believes that increasing FTEs towards new contract actions will achieve an acceptable backlog by 2020, and will lead to a workforce capacity to meet the post-award contracting demands. We observed that new contracting action delays are caused not only by the lack of manpower in the contracting office, but also by emergent contracting requirements and the quality of some of the contracting input provided by program offices. NAVSEA leadership authorized the contracting directorate to increase FTEs in a phased approach to address this persistent contracting backlog.




Figure 2. New Contracting Action Backlog

Recommendation 5. That NAVSEA SEA 02 publish metrics that include quantity and type of rework and trends by program that are impacting contracting delays for both new and post-award contracting actions.

Recommendation 6. That NAVSEA SEA 02 track and measure customer feedback from PEOs.

Budget Submission Function

NAVSEA Budget Formulation is in compliance with OPNAVINST 5450.340, and DoD Financial Management Regulation Volumes 2A, Budget Formulation and Presentation (Chapters 1-3), and 2B, Budget Formulation and Presentation (Chapters 4-19). Most of NAVSEA's budget exhibits are well prepared and provide sufficient information on all programs in the respective line items. While the Investment Budget Documents (Procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation documents) are submitted in accordance with regulations, some submissions do not include sufficient program descriptions or funding purposes, which may contribute to processing delays due to requests for additional information.

Recommendation 7. That NAVSEA ensures that Investment Budget Documents include precise program descriptions and funding purposes prior to submission.

Recommendation 8. That NAVSEA incorporates sharing of best practices for the submission of budget documents through the command's budget staff.

Field Activity Oversight

NAVSEA provides oversight of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), via a collaborative Board of Directors as codified in a joint NSWC/NUWC instruction 5450.1. This document aligns objectives with the mission, provides guidance for managing workload, standardizes processes, ensures stewardship of technical resources, and helps properly shape the workforce. Through the Board of Directors, NAVSEA ensures that each warfare center accepts work only in its assigned mission and leadership areas. Furthermore, NAVSEA manages warfare center acceptance and assignment of non-naval work through a written approval process, as codified in a joint policy memorandum signed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition).

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

OPNAVINST 8027.1H, Naval Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program (EOD) and Mission Support, identifies the Navy as the single manager and executive agent for DoD EOD Technology and Training and specifies additional NAVSEA responsibilities to manage funds for research and development programs for EOD tools, equipment, procedures, technical publications, and design specification in support of joint-service EOD requirements and to manage funds for procurement of service-approved tools, equipment, and publications.

SEA 06EXM is the program manager for Antiterrorism Afloat systems (non-lethal weapons, body armor and ballistic helmets, and visual augmentation systems), Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare systems (dismounted/man-portable, vehicle mounted, fixed site, and test sets), and EOD tools and technology (Mk18 UUVs, Marine Mammal Systems, EOD robotic systems). SEA 06NSW provides program management for small arms (.50 caliber and smaller), crew served and stabilized small arms mounts, service common munitions, visual augmentation systems, and premeditated personnel parachuting systems. They also manage the PEO M program (SEAL Delivery Vehicle, diving equipment) and PEO SP programs (classified Naval Special Warfare support programs).

SEA 06EXM and 06NSW maintain and utilize strong relationships and communication with their respective active duty and civilian counterparts up and down echelons, indicating a high degree of professionalism and motivation to serve the fleet (mission accomplishment). Fleet equipment and system acquisition needs from their respective communities are efficiently characterized and communicated to SEA 06 in collaboration with resource sponsors, and solutions are efficiently developed and fielded in accordance with DoD acquisition policy.

Ship Repair

As required by OPNAVINST 5450.340, NAVSEA executes maintenance and modernization planning for their assigned classes of ship and submarine programs. Team Ships and Team Submarine have worked diligently to improve the fleet-wide validity of Current Ships Maintenance Projects. Additionally, NAVSEA works closely with the Type Commanders to improve and maintain the quality of Class Maintenance Plans. Dedicated work in these two

areas have combined to enable better long-term planning for maintenance availabilities, which leads to less emergent work and a more efficient, affordable shipyard period.

NAVSEA adequately performs oversight functions over nuclear and non-nuclear shipyards through Supervisors of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP), echelon 3 commands co-located with the shipyards. SUPSHIP commands are staffed and trained to perform their important mission successfully.

Diving and Salvage

SEA 00C understands and is well prepared to perform its operational and administrative missions. They maintain strong connections with the active duty and commercial diving and salvage communities to quickly identify and incorporate new technology, as well as utilize world-class subject matter experts on the SEA 00C staff and in the diving and salvage community. Relationships, communication, and collaboration with related Navy and federal agencies are robust and effective in support of the marine salvage, pollution abatement, and Joint Military Diving Technology and Training missions. SEA 00C's diving system certification and inspection approach is proactive and contributes to operational readiness, safety, and uniformity of standards.

SEA 00C, the Navy's single source for deep water salvage, maintains one deep-water salvage contractor and three general salvage contractors (one contractor per each of the three oceanic zones) to provide immediate response given the limited fleet assets available. In the past, the Navy maintained a robust salvage and towing vessel fleet and personnel talent pool (military and civilian). Currently, the towing and salvage fleet consists of only four towing (T-ATF) and four salvage (T-ARS) platforms operated by Military Sealift Command. These platforms are aged and operationally obsolete. The T-ATS (X) program will provide a replacement. The military manpower has also downsized and evolved to expeditionary skills. For these reasons, NAVSEA 00C has taken on a greater operational role in supporting salvage operations, as well as the diving system technical authority.

Information Technology Acquisition

NAVSEA's IT Acquisition and Network Management Programs are not fully compliant. The command has not performed a complete inventory of all IT assets, nor tracks them in an Accountable Property System of Record (APSR). Assets in the main computer room have not been completely inventoried and a spot check of assets in building 197 showed that the inventory listing maintained by SEA 00I is only 79.7 percent accurate. Further, NAVSEA maintains a listing of property inventory on an Excel spreadsheet vice an APSR. NAVSEA policy and procedure regarding IT assets has also not been updated to reflect corresponding DoD and Department of the Navy (DON) policies.

The NAVSEA headquarters' Information Assurance Manager (IAM) will continue to be a Navy Working Capital Fund, echelon 4, civilian billet after the SEA 00I Reporting Structure reorganization. Because the responsibilities of the IAM include the development and maintenance of the command IA Program, to include the identification of IA objectives,

personnel, and policies, we recommend that the IAM billet be transferred to the headquarters' unit identification code (UIC).

Deficiency 1. SEA 00I has not performed a complete inventory of all IT assets owned by the command and does not maintain that inventory in an APSR. Reference: SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5200.42, Accountability and Management of Department of the Navy Property, Section 4.a(3).

Deficiency 2. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Deficiency 3. SEA 02 has allowed individual managers to retain individual single-function printers to be used in place of mandatory multi-functional devices for printing. Reference: DoD CIO Memorandum of February 17, 2012, Subj: Optimizing Use of Employee Information Technology (IT) Devices and Other Information Technologies to Achieve Efficiencies, Attachment 1, paragraph 1.f.

Deficiency 4. SEA 00I has not applied mandatory default settings on multi-functional devices. Reference: DON CIO Memorandum of January 25, 2013, Subj: Mandatory Guidance Regarding Management of Department of the Navy Copiers, Printers, Fax Machines, Scanners, and Multi-Functional Devices, Enclosure (1), paragraphs 3 and 4.

Deficiency 5. SEA 00I does not have an Acceptable Use Policy for all portable electronic devices. Reference: DON CIO Message, DTG: 031648Z Oct 11, Subject: Acceptable Use Policy for Department of the Navy (DON) Information Technology (IT) Resources, paragraph 6.

Recommendation 9. That NAVSEA 00I identify a single government point of contact responsible for circuit management.

Recommendation 10. That the NAVSEA IAM billet be transferred to UIC N00024.

Strategic Planning

Strategic business planning functions are performed well by the SEA 00X, Chief Strategy Office. The office is lean, and comprised of senior personnel with diverse skill sets to include a Chief Strategy Officer and four additional civilian personnel. SEA 00X develops, communicates, updates, and measures the NAVSEA Commander's Strategic Business Plan with current mission priorities, focus areas, key enablers, and values depicted in Figure 3.




Figure 3. NAVSEA Strategic Business Plan Excerpt

The Commander has attempted to increase awareness of the plan to the workforce and has provided direct leadership guidance of mission priorities, while promoting the strategic business plan as fundamental to the NAVSEA culture and its success. This is evidenced by the change in the second edition of the NAVSEA Strategic Business Plan, which includes a new pillar on cybersecurity, and modified elements of the Strategic Business Plan to better align NAVSEA's mission execution based upon inputs received at the Commander's Forum. SEA 00X is uniquely positioned to assist in this effort by reporting directly to the NAVSEA Commander and charged with providing an enduring, intellectual, and independent focus on strategic planning, execution, and transformation across command organizational boundaries.

The NAVSEA annual strategic business planning cycle consists of an environmental scan (e.g. CNO guidance) to assess emerging technologies for tech warrant holder consideration, threats, and external trends; analyses of internal, external, customer, and stakeholder requirements; a Strategic Business Planning Forum previously known as the Commander's Conference, to provide a voice to commanding officers enabling cross communication to shape/reshape strategic direction and refine objectives, goals, and focus areas as needed. Of note, SEA 00X currently tracks and provides dashboard displays on 259 metrics to the Commander. The NAVSEA strategic planning process is robust, able to incorporate input from the bottom-up as well as respond to top-down guidance, agile enough to adjust to emergent requirements, and has sufficient fidelity to establish metrics capable of enhancing resource decisions.

The NAVSEA business strategy is aligned to optimize organizational structures for execution and to capitalize on selected Strategic Business Plan focus areas and objectives. The NAVSEA Standard Organization and Regulation Manual (SORM), dated 2009, articulates the purpose of SEA 00X “to ensure short/long-range strategic business planning translates into execution.” The clear, well-codified, impactful enterprise roles for the Chief Strategy Officer and Chief Strategy Office as detailed in the SORM are considered an echelon 2 best practice. All too often, strategy is divorced from execution, the budgetary process, and innovation. This is not the case at NAVSEA. Recent Commanders have empowered this talented strategic planning cell to drive change across the NAVSEA enterprise and entrusted them with the significant responsibilities of executing BRAC law, identifying, evaluating, and collaborating with other NAVSEA organizations for personnel reductions to comply with the National Defense Authorization Act-mandated MHA Reduction Act, and to partner within and external to the DoD with other public, private, and government agencies. This arrangement works, despite the complexity and enormity of NAVSEA, and can serve as a model for other echelon 2 commands.

Continuity of Operations

NAVSEA headquarters Continuity of Operations (COOP) is outlined in NAVSEAINST S3730.1B, NAVSEA Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program, and is compliant with SECNAVINST 3030.4C, Department of the Navy Continuity of Operations Program, and OPNAVINST 3030.5B, Navy Continuity of Operations Program and Policy.

Civilian Human Resources

SEA 10 Directorate is responsible for two distinct human resource (HR) missions and authorities that are normally executed through a DCHR and Human Resources Office (HRO), as prescribed by SECNAVINST 12250.6A, Civilian Human Resources Management in the Department of the Navy. However, under the current organization, these mission areas share the same HR personnel resources. This organizational structure has resulted in the DCHR being too involved in the HR service delivery vice accomplishing prescribed functions of providing HR advice to NAVSEA leadership that affects the enterprise and its ten other HROs, and publishing NAVSEA HR policies. We repeatedly heard from NAVSEA headquarters staff and program offices that they were dissatisfied with the timeliness and quality of the recruitment and hiring support provided by the NAVSEA HRO. We obtained the NAVSEA hiring metrics and scorecard from OCHR and learned that the continuous delay in the hiring process that stands out is the time it takes management to make a selection and return the certificates. It will take a team effort to improve the hiring timelines.

Recommendation 11. That NAVSEA download and publish the OCHR Major Command Hiring Scorecard on a recurring basis to provide transparency of the hiring process to NAVSEA headquarters and PEO leadership.

In our opinion, the DCHR and HRO are not manned adequately to meet workload requirements. The lack of policies and the resulting inefficiencies, coupled with a sizable HR “shadow” staff are masking the true workload and thus we are unable to provide a complete assessment of the HR manning requirements.

The lack of published NAVSEA HR policies and guidance has resulted in inefficient processes and an unacceptable level of ambiguity in HR decision making, not only for headquarters, but also for the enterprise. A published standard for conducting civilian personnel recruitment and staffing is a meaningful tool for managers and provides the foundation for consistent civilian staffing practices across an enterprise. We understand that the Merit Promotion Plan and other HR policies are being drafted. Other policies are required to provide framework and guidance for the Pathways Program, Awards Program, staffing and classification, discipline, workforce development, and permanent change of station.

During the implementation phase of the current DON HR Service Delivery model that began in 2013, Budget Submitting Offices were directed to identify “shadow” staff performing HR work outside of the HROs and realign those resources into the HROs. We found no evidence that this occurred at NAVSEA. SECNAVINST 12250.6A states that assignment of substantive HR work to positions classified outside the 0200 occupational series is prohibited. Reviewing and correcting current NAVSEA “shadow” staff position descriptions (PDs) is required to ensure compliance.

Our review of a small sample of PDs uncovered several discrepancies that require correction. We observed numerous PDs for Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) designated positions that did not contain acquisition responsibilities. This DAWIA related finding may impact Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Funding (Section 852) related to incentives and training, for example – paying off student loans.

Deficiency 6. NAVSEA does not have a published Merit Promotion Plan, as required by 5 CFR 335.103.

Deficiency 7. NAVSEA did not realign “shadow” HR staffs into the HRO, as required by SENAVINST 12250.6A.

Deficiency 8. Several PDs for DAWIA designated positions reviewed did not contain acquisition responsibilities as required by the DAWIA Operating Guide, dated 21 December 2011.

Deficiency 9. Several Superior Qualification Appointments reviewed were not in accordance with the Civilian Human Resources Manual and 5 CFR 531.212.

Recommendation 12. That NAVSEA complete and publish a Merit Promotion Plan.

Recommendation 13. That NAVSEA make development and issuance of HR policies a top priority.

Recommendation 14. That NAVSEA review all 2013-15 Superior Qualification Appointments to ensure they were executed in accordance with Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 5333, 5 CFR part 531.212, DoDI 1400.25 V531, and DON CHRM subchapter 550.

Recommendation 15. That NAVSEA conduct a review of the expenditure of 852 funding, crosschecked with the associated PDs to determine if the funding was used appropriately.

Based on these and other HR related issues we found during the visit, we recommend that OCHR conduct a Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework (HCAAF) visit, or a “deep dive” into NAVSEA’s records and HR functions. This will give the command a more comprehensive assessment of the NAVSEA HR functions, identify areas and records needing correction, facilitate better leveraging of the talent that resides in SEA 10H, and will result in a better understanding of workforce development requirements.

Recommendation 16. That NAVSEA request OCHR conduct an HCAAF visit.

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Certification

NASVEA has designated headquarters and enterprise DAWIA Program Managers to oversee DAWIA command compliance per the DON DAWIA Operating Guide of 24 June 2014.

As of 30 September 2015, 100 percent of NAVSEA headquarters staff DAWIA-coded billets (5 UICs/1520 billets: 85 military/1435 civilians/5 contractors) meet DAWIA certification requirements, per DoDI 5000.66, Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Workforce Education, Training and Career Development Program.

Ninety-eight percent of NAVSEA enterprise DAWIA-coded billets (59 UICs/17,990 billets: 374 military/17,616) meet DAWIA certification requirements per DoDI 5000.66. Headquarters, PEOs and Field Activities all have DAWIA points of contact responsible for monitory Acquisition Workforce (AWF) certification requirements and waiver requests, as required.

Enterprise-wide, NAVSEA met or exceeded three of the applicable FY15 goals outlined in ASN(RD&A) Memorandum of 17 September 2013, Subj: FY15 DON DAWIA Goals, specifically:

- Goal 1 - Certification Levels: 95 percent of AWF members become certified to the level required by their position within allowable timeframes.
NAVSEA: 97.7 percent
- Goal 2 - Continuous Learning (CL): 90 percent of AWF members have current CL certificates.
NAVSEA: 97.7 percent
- Goal 3 - Acquisition Corps Membership for Critical Acquisition Positions (CAP):
95 percent of CAPs be filled by Acquisition Corps Members at the time of assignment to the CAP.
NAVSEA: 94.6 percent
- Goal 4 - PMT 401/402 Compliance: 100 percent of Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II Program Managers (PMs) and Deputy Program Manager (DPMs) complete Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Program Manager's Course PMT 401 and PMT 402 within six months of their PM/DM assignment.
NAVSEA: 100 percent
- Goal 5 - Key Leadership Positions (KLP): 100 percent of individuals assigned to KLPs are fully qualified.
NAVSEA: 93 percent

A small sample of PDs in the 0343 series were reviewed to determine if DAWIA coded positions contained required acquisition duties. Of the six PDs reviewed, four showed no acquisition related duties. This finding has significant impact in terms of direct access to Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (Section 852), which provides funding for incentives and training (i.e., student loan repayment) as well as impacts the ability of the command to utilize a direct hire authority (Expedited Hire Authority).

In accordance with the DON DAWIA Operating Guide of 24 June 2014, Program Management positions are a typical occupational series, 0343. The general acquisition related duties describe work in the conceptualization, initiation, design development, test, contracting, production, deployment, logistical support, modification and disposal of weapons and other systems, supplies, or services (including construction) to satisfy DoD needs, intended for use in, or in support of military missions. The positions reviewed do not involve tasks associated with the DON DAWIA Operating Guide.

Deficiency 10. Not all NAVSEA 0343 PDs contain required acquisition duties, as required by DON DAWIA Operating Guide dated 24 June 2014.

Recommendation 17. That NAVSEA review all 0343 series PDs to ensure they are properly coded for acquisition duties.

Interim Performance Management System

The Interim Personnel Management System (IPMS) is not compliant with DON Civilian Human Resources Manual, Subchapter 430.1, paragraph 6b and 6c2b, DON Performance Management Programs. We reviewed a random sample of FY14 DON interim performance appraisal forms and found untimely execution of IPMS requirements of NAVSEA headquarters civilian employee performance plans, progress reviews, and annual appraisals. We found that three of 45 performance plans were established on time (by 30 October 2013), 28 of 45 progress reviews were completed on time (by 31 May 2014), and 20 of 45 annual assessments were completed on time (by 14 December 2014). NAVSEA headquarters and PEOs are transitioning to the Acquisition Demonstration Project in March 2016, at which time DON IPMS requirements will no longer be required.

Equal Employment Opportunity

The NAVSEA Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program is not fully compliant. The command is not completing all EEO investigations within the established deadline of 180 days. The command's failure to meet the established timeline for 100 percent of the EEO investigations may result in significant financial cost to the command.

Deficiency 11. Not all NAVSEA EEO complaint investigations are completed within 180 days, as required by 29 CFR part 1614 and EEO Management Directive MD-110.

Military/Civilian Training

Personnel Mandatory Training/Qualifications

The NAVSEA Training Office does not effectively track individual training requirements for military, civilian, and contractor staff. The command was unable to provide FY14 training completion metrics, in accordance with OPNAVINST 3120.32D, Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy.

Recommendation 18. That NAVSEA Training Officer collaborates with divisions/departments to develop a single headquarters training program.

Recommendation 19. That required training completion data for headquarters and PEO personnel are tracked.

General Military Training

General Military Training (GMT) is not completed by all military personnel, as directed by OPNAVINST 1500.22G, General Military Training, NAVADMIN 264/13 and 202/14, General Military Training, and FY15 General Military Training Schedule, respectively. NAVSEA did not have FY14 data available. FY15 GMT completion rate was 60 percent (Category 1 topics) and 73 percent (Category 2 topics), vice the required 100 percent.

Deficiency 12. NAVSEA headquarters GMT Category 1 and 2 topics are not completed by all military personnel. References: OPNAVINST 1500.22G, paragraph 4c and 6d(2); NAVADMINs 264/13 and 202/14.

Recommendation 20. That at the end of the fiscal year, NAVSEA records a snapshot of Fleet Training Management. Planning System to capture training of personnel on board for archival purposes.

Civilian Training

Civilian training requirements are not completed as directed by SECNAVINST 12410.25, Civilian Employee Training and Career Development, and the DON Office of Civilian Human Resources. NAVSEA's overall FY15 civilian training completion rate was 79 percent. Supervisors of civilian employees training completion rate in FY15 was 23 percent. NAVSEA is on track to meet FY16 training requirements.

Deficiency 13. NAVSEA civilian mandatory training requirements are not completed by all civilian personnel. References: SECNAVINST 12410.25, paragraph 5f; DON Office of Civilian Human Resources website.

Recommendation 21. That NAVSEA incorporate the use of DON Total Workforce Management Services, which hosts and records approximately 70 percent of all OCHR required training, into their civilian training tracking process.

FACILITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

NAVSEA is effectively executing shore related mission requirements with respect to facilities, environmental, and energy conservation, as well as specific responsibilities regarding explosive safety. NAVSEA Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Programs meet most required elements in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

Facilities

NAVSEA headquarters personnel are spread across seven buildings in the Washington Navy Yard (WNY). The majority of headquarters and PEO personnel are co-located in buildings 197, 201, and 176. Due to the number of NAVSEA employees assigned on the WNY, NAVSEA established a facilities division to manage space utilization in their buildings, as well as a NAVSEA trouble desk to liaison with Naval Support Activity (NSA) Washington Public Works Department and track building maintenance. NAVSEA's space allocation database is accurate and well maintained; we consider this tool as a best practice. It can be used to create plans to relocate individual or blocks of employees into, out of, or within their assigned spaces rapidly and effectively.

During the 2010 NAVSEA Command Inspection, we documented a rodent problem within the NAVSEA buildings. The NAVSEA Facilities Division has been instrumental in reducing this problem by more closely tracking employee reports of rodents, coordinating with Public Works, and applying additional pest control treatments above the Navy wide standard. We note that Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) has increased the Navy's facilities services funding from Common Output Level (COL) -4 to COL-3, which is expected to further mitigate this issue.

In pre-event survey comments and focus group remarks, several NAVSEA employees indicated concerns regarding Antiterrorism Force Protection (ATFP) features in building 197, citing concerns with their overall security. NAVSEA recently returned headquarters functions back into building 197 in the spring of 2015. The building 197 renovation was valued at \$42 million and did not trigger Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) ATFP upgrades, because the project value was well under half of the cost to replace the entire building (plant replacement value is listed as \$235 million in the Facility Readiness Evaluation System).

Given NAVSEA's notable industrial responsibilities and relatively large workforce, they have significant interest in their supporting infrastructure, which includes dry docks, repair shops, and assembly facilities, as well as utilities and administrative spaces. We noted sound oversight and direction of NAVSEA enterprise infrastructure requirements; echelon 3 and below requirements are captured in the annual Shipyard Infrastructure Board and Warfare Center Infrastructure Board, which are then consolidated, prioritized, and briefed to the NAVSEA Commander. Additionally, NAVSEA headquarters tracks Fleet Readiness Enterprise (e.g. Surface Warfare Enterprise) infrastructure requirements that support NAVSEA acquisition programs through their PEOs to ensure fielding and sustainment of weapons systems align with delivery

schedules. This work occurs prior to submitting a consolidated list to CNIC to support the Navy wide Military Construction and Special Project Decision Lens process.

Safety and Occupational Health

We assessed NAVSEA programs against 29 U.S.C. 651-678, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, SOH-related regulations promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), policies outlined in OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, and other safety-related references, including NAVSEA 5100.12B, System Safety Engineering Policy. NAVSEA SOH Programs are effective, but not fully compliant. During our inspection, we assessed the following SOH Program areas:

- Headquarters SOH organization and staffing
- Safety Councils, Committees, and Working Groups
- Oversight of SOH Programs at Subordinate Commands
- SOH Management Evaluations
- Operational Risk Management
- Explosive Safety
- Fire safety
- Fall Protection
- Energy control
- Confined space entry
- Hazardous material control and management
- Mishap Reporting/Hazard abatement
- System Safety in Acquisition
- Traffic Safety (including Motorcycle Safety)
- Recreational/Off-Duty Safety
- Medical surveillance
- Safety Trend Analysis

Prior to this inspection, NAVSEA SEA 04RS Safety Manager provided a program assessment that self-identified many of the deficiencies noted in this section of the report.

Safety And Occupational Health Organization, Training, and Oversight

Safety Program responsibilities have been delegated to the Director of NAVSEA SEA 04RS, but this individual has no direct reporting relationship to the Commander.

Deficiency 14. The designated Safety Official has no direct reporting relationship to the commander. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Sections 0204 and 0302.

Deficiency 15. NAVSEA has not prepared Plans of Action and Milestones to ensure self-assessment deficiencies are corrected. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0505, paragraph c.

Deficiency 16. Some NAVSEA headquarters safety personnel have not completed required core training courses. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0602, paragraph d.(2).

Deficiency 17. NAVSEA Contacting Officer Representatives (CORs) are not provided the safety training required for the contracts they oversee, such as shipbuilding and ship repair contracts. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Chapter 6.

Deficiency 18. NAVSEA top management, supervisors, and employees are not receiving the safety training required for their responsibilities. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Chapter 6, Appendix 6-A.

Deficiency 19. Individual Development Plans were not consistently implemented, as required for NAVSEA 04RS safety professionals. OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0602, paragraph d.(1).

Safety Trend Analysis

NAVSEA does not comprehensively review subordinate echelons' mishap and trend analysis when reviewing injury and mishap data. NAVSEA reviews activities' Total Case Incident Rates, Days Away Restricted Time, Job Transfer injuries, and consolidates data on number and type of mishaps. However, NAVSEA does not analyze the data to determine causal factors. Chapter 106 of the NAVSEA's Occupational Safety Health and Environmental Control Manual (OSHECM) does not specifically require trend analysis of activities involving risk to personnel, such as electrical safety.

Deficiency 20. NAVSEA does not properly conduct trend analysis of mishap data. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, paragraph 1408.

Safety Councils, Committees, and Working Groups

NAVSEA headquarters had previously been using the Volunteer Protection Program (VPP) Steering Committee meetings to satisfy the safety council meetings required by instruction; however, the last documented VPP Steering Committee meeting was held in September 2013.

Deficiency 21. NAVSEA headquarters is not conducting required safety council meetings. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0402.f.

Safety and Health Management Evaluation

NAVSEA safety oversight is provided during the NAVSEA Inspector General (IG) inspections. While conducting inspections with the NAVSEA IG, only findings are recorded. Current NAVSEA IG processes limit the scope of inspections and amount of discussion in final reports that might otherwise demonstrate evaluation of the elements required by instruction, such as mishap prevention efforts, self-assessment quality, and mishap trend evaluation.

Recommendation 22. That NAVSEA IG inspections document all areas reviewed during oversight inspections. Reference: OPNAVINST 23G, Section 0904.

Confined Space Entry

NAVSEA serves as the technical warrant and authors of S6470-AA-SAF-010, Naval Maritime Confined Space Program, regarding confined space entry aboard ships. Oversight is conducted during safety reviews of public shipyards, but is not conducted at all locations.

Deficiency 22. NAVSEA is not conducting oversight of Maritime Confined Space operations at all naval maritime facilities. Reference: S6470-AA-SAF-010, Section 1.8.1.

There are seven Board-Certified Gas Free Engineers in the naval enterprise that meet the qualifications outlined in SECNAVINST 5100.16B, Navy Gas-Free Engineering Certification/Re-certification. Given the Navy's 11 maritime facilities, there has been inadequate succession planning and oversight conducted to ensure coverage for the naval enterprise.

Recommendation 23. That NAVSEA develop succession plans to replace Board-Certified Gas Free Engineers that have reached or will soon reach retirement eligibility.

Traffic, Recreation/Off-Duty Safety

NAVSEA does not have a Recreation/Off-Duty Safety (RODS) Program at headquarters, and has not designated a RODS Program Manager or Coordinator in writing, as required by instruction. However, the NAVSEA IG conducts oversight of lower echelon RODS Programs. We noted that NAVSEA's Motorcycle Safety Program is current with no training delinquencies for military riders, as required by OPNAVINST 5100.12J, Navy Traffic Safety Program.

Deficiency 23. NAVSEA headquarters has not fully implemented a RODS Program and has not adopted the host installation's RODS Program. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.25C, paragraph 5.h.(1).

Deficiency 24. NAVSEA headquarters' RODS Program has been established, but does not meet all elements required by instruction. Reference: OPNAVINST 5100.25C, paragraph 5.h.(2).

Operational Risk Management

NAVSEA self-identified the lack of a headquarters Operational Risk Management (ORM) Program, ORM Program Manager designated in writing, and an ORM evaluation policy for the command.

Deficiency 25. NAVSEA has not developed uniform, enterprise-wide guidance for identifying procedures and instructions appropriate for ORM application. Reference: OPNAVINST 3500.39C, paragraph 6.c.(1).

Deficiency 26. NAVSEA has not developed an ORM evaluation policy for subordinate commands. Reference: OPNAVINST 3500.39C, paragraph 6.c.(2).

Deficiency 27. NAVSEA headquarters does not have an ORM Program. Reference: OPNAVINST 3500.39C, paragraph 6.g.(1).

Deficiency 28. NAVSEA headquarters has not designated a command ORM Manager in writing. Reference: OPNAVINST 3500.39C, paragraph 6.g.(2).

Occupational Safety and Health Environment Control Manual

NAVSEA published the OSHECM to serve as the sole program guidance for each of the public shipyards, ensuring uniformity under the "One Shipyard" concept. We commend this standardization and collaboration effort between NAVSEA headquarters and the public

shipyards. Since the OSHECM prohibits individual shipyards from promulgating additional guidance, all pertinent information on activities in the shipyards should be included in this document to achieve full compliance. We noted some areas lacking specificity and address them in subsequent paragraphs.

OSHECM, Chapter 220 on Fall Hazards uses 5-feet as the singular fall hazard standard for all shipyard operations. This standard exposes shipyard personnel to increased risk and is contrary to 29 CFR 1910.23, Guarding Floor and Wall Openings and Holes, which requires protection for any drop of 4-feet or more. 29 CFR 1915, which uses the 5-foot standard, applies to all ship repairing, shipbuilding, and shipbreaking and related employments. 29 CFR 1915.4(j) further defines ship repair and ship repairing to mean any repair of a vessel including, but not restricted to, alterations, conversions, installations, cleaning, painting, and maintenance work. Although the shipyard as a whole supports these operations, many related work activities do not meet the intent of the aforementioned definitions in 29 CFR 1915. Examples of non-included activities in the shipyard include work in warehouses and machine shops where 29 CFR 1910.23(b)(1) with the 4-foot fall protection standard should be applied instead of 29 CFR 1915 with the 5-foot standard. We note at the time of this inspection that a revision to Chapter 220 was in the final review stages to resolve these issues.

Recommendation 24. That NAVSEA revise OSHECM, Chapter 220 to use a 4-foot height standard for fall protection for work activities not directly involving ship repairs. Reference: 29 CFR 1910.23, Guarding Floor and Wall Openings and Holes, Section (b)(1).

Recommendation 25. That NAVSEA revise OSHECM, Chapter 220 does not list the requirements of competent or qualified persons regarding fall protection. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0 - 2012, paragraph 2.30.

Recommendation 26. That NAVSEA revise OSHECM, Chapter 220 does not specify weight limitations for fall protection equipment. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012, paragraph E2.128.

Recommendation 27. That NAVSEA revise OSHECM, Chapter 220 does not require refresher training for the Fall Protection Program. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012, paragraph E2.11.

Recommendation 28. That NAVSEA revise OSHECM, Chapter 220 does not provide the list of required initial and refresher training for all personnel exposed to fall hazards and using fall protection equipment. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012, paragraph E2.11.

Chapter 230 of the OSHECM provides electrical safety guidance; however, this guidance conflicts with governing standards.

Deficiency 29. OSHECM, Chapter 230 Electrical Safety Policy C. 9 does not require a Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) trained person for initial voltage verification or hot work on circuits less than 1000 volts. Reference: Unified Facility Criteria 3-560-01 Electrical Safety, O & M, Section 1-8.3/2/.

OSHECM, Chapter 330 deals with hazardous material and hazardous waste, including painting and blasting activities. However, the acceptable levels of toxic metal are unclear, as well as the appropriate controls based on those levels. Additional specifics are needed to better clarify acceptable limits and procedures to mitigate potential risks to shipyard personnel. Additionally, Chapter 330 was unclear on when sampling shall occur (while underway or immediately before ship maintenance availability). Additional requirements in 29 CFR 1910.1025, 1026, and 1027 could be required depending on concentration and duration of employee exposure.

Recommendation 29. That NAVSEA include specific American National Standards Institute (ANSI) requirements for competent or qualified persons regarding fall protection in OSHECM, Chapter 220. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012, paragraph 2.30.

Deficiency 30. OSHECM, Chapter 330 does not specify HEPA for ventilation or other OSHA requirements for long-term exposure to toxic metals. Reference: 29 CFR 1910.1025, paragraph (e)(4)(i) and (ii).

Deficiency 31. That NAVSEA include specific ANSI weight limitations for fall protection equipment in OSHECM, Chapter 220. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012, paragraph E2.128.

Recommendation 30. That NAVSEA include specific ANSI requirements for Fall Protection Program refresher training in OSHECM, Chapter 220. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012, paragraph E2.11.

There is no standard guidance provided in the OSHECM for safety risk management or implementation of a Safety Management System. Chapter 420 covers the Environmental Management System, but Job Safety Analysis is listed in the ergonomic chapter of the OSHECM.

Recommendation 31. That NAVSEA include a list of ANSI-required initial and refresher training for all personnel who are exposed to fall hazards and who use fall protection equipment in OSHECM, Chapter 220. Reference: ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012, paragraph E2.11.

Deficiency 32. OSHECM, Chapter 320 does not include storage or access requirements of Safety Data Sheets for hazardous material. References: 29 CFR 1910.1200(q)(10); 29 CFR 1910.106 (a)(19); 29 CFR 1910.106(a)(29).

Recommendation 32. That NAVSEA replace the term Material Safety Data Sheet with the current term, Safety Data Sheet, throughout the OSHECM, in accordance with changes to the Globally Harmonized System for Hazard Communication.

Mishap Reporting

Deficiency 33. NAVSEA does not consistently use the Web-Enabled Safety System to report personnel injury mishaps. Reference: OPNAVINST 5102.1D, Section 3007; OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 1403.

Deficiency 34. NAVSEA does not consistently ensure that naval shipyards consistently file Material Damage Mishap Reports to the Naval Safety Center or record this data on a corporate level. Reference: OPNAVINST 5102.1D, Section 3004.

Fire Protection during Ship Availability

NAVSEA Instruction S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010, Industrial Ship Safety Manual for Fire Prevention and Response, was written to address the prevention of fires aboard ships during ship maintenance. The instruction is two years old and identifies oversight responsibility, but there was no evidence that oversight has been performed. NAVSEA indicated that funding and manpower had been identified and secured to perform these oversight inspections commencing in 2016.

Deficiency 35. No oversight of required actions for fire prevention during ship maintenance availabilities have been accomplished or scheduled. Reference: NAVSEAINST S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010, Section 1.2.5.2.

NAVSEA Instruction S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010 requirements have been incorporated into ship repair as standard items, but these requirements have not been included in contracts for new ship construction.

Deficiency 36. Shipboard fire prevention requirements have not been included in new ship construction contracts. Reference: NAVSEAINST S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010, Section 2.6.2.

We noted that several different groups within NAVSEA were reviewing shipboard fires that occur during repair and construction activities. NAVSEA O4RS only reviews fires that are submitted via Trouble Report, but lower level fires are not recorded or reviewed for trend analysis.

Deficiency 37. NAVSEA does not centrally record and review all shipboard fires for trends. Reference: NAVSEAINST S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010, Section 2.4.3.

Explosive Safety

NAVSEA serves as the technical warrant and conducts oversight of explosive safety programs for the naval enterprise. Explosive Safety Officer placement and oversight is not uniform throughout the naval enterprise. In fact, there are two distinct models. The “west coast model” involves management and oversight primarily by Navy Munitions Command. The “east coast model” involves management and oversight by CNIC via base operating safety support. As currently managed, there is a potential for increased risk, as well as non-optimal oversight or execution of explosive safety programs.

Recommendation 33. That NAVSEA clarify oversight requirements with CNIC and Navy Munitions Command to ensure uniform explosive safety support to the naval enterprise.

System Safety Risk Program

System safety engineering principles and practices were implemented across all NAVSEA ACAT programs, and processes were in place to support all phases of the system lifecycle. For each program, the designated Principal for Safety has the authority to implement and execute a System Safety Program, which enhances risk communication to the appropriate authorities. We observed usage of tailored system safety risk matrices across several major ACAT programs, but the matrices had not been formally approved by the relevant program authorities, as

required by MIL-STD-882E, DoD Standard Practice for System Safety. At the time of the inspection, NAVSEA was routing several of these matrices for formal approval.

Issue Paper A-1 provides further detail.

Deficiency 38. NAVSEA is using tailored System Safety Risk Matrices that have not been approved in writing by the cognizant authority. Reference: MIL-STD-882E, DoD Standard Practice for System Safety, paragraph 4.3.7.

System Safety in Acquisition

While NAVINSGEN evaluates command-wide safety performance, the link between acquisition, sustainment, and operations is critical. System Safety is also supported by DoD policy, with an increasing focus on life-cycle sustainment, total ownership cost, and risk management. Thus, the feedback role provided by users and maintainers deserves special attention.

NAVSEA maintains two primary organizational groups with safety management expertise and oversight. SEA 05S manages system safety programs as a part of the systems engineering process and SEA 04R (part of the logistics directorate) is responsible for shore safety management. NAVSEA 04R headquarters efforts with Systems Engineering/Acquisition Directorate (SEA 04) and the Logistics and Commonality Directorate (SEA 06) are considered noteworthy in the following areas:

- SEA 04RS serves as the technical authority for safety in NAVSEA, including technical oversight of specific safety systems and the safety of varied support systems and equipment. This role is supported by SEA 05S, which provides process management and related oversight, including publication of the NAVSEA system safety policy, NAVSEAINST 5100.12B.
- Ongoing participation and knowledge of SEA 04 is in the acquisition review/systems engineering process, including participation in several platform system safety working groups; numerous Integrated Logistics Assessments and varied DoD and DON working groups with acquisition and logistics influence.
- NAVSEA has established the Shipyard Ergonomics Community of Practice.
- Multi-code involvement in mishap evaluation and ongoing hazard tracking, including the investigation and tracking of ship and shipyard class A and B mishaps.

An area for potential improvement is the lack of involvement and level of expertise of line-level (depot and warfare center) safety and health professionals in providing input to acquisition and logistics. This is not a “regulatory” deficiency, but a best practice that would conserve Navy human and fiscal resources. Line-level engagement meets the full intent of SECNAVINST 5100.12 regarding application of safety management systems. This also aligns with DoD and Navy 5000 series instruction requirements for system safety and life-cycle management in acquisition, as well as life-cycle application of Military Standard 882E on system safety.

Issue Paper A-2 addresses these issues in further detail.

Environmental Readiness

NAVSEA is compliant with federal statutes and regulations, DON governing instructions, and policies, OPNAVINST 5090.1D (Environmental Readiness Program Manual), and NAVSEA's own instructions and policies. Evaluation of environmental compliance and environmental planning was conducted in the following areas:

- Environmental Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
- Environmental Management System Auditing and Compliance Assessments
- Hazardous Materials/Hazardous Waste Management
- Spill Preparedness and Response
- Historic Ships Afloat Management

NAVSEA executes a strong and well-organized environmental program, providing effective oversight of subordinate activities with respect to environmental compliance programs. We noted a particularly strong Spill Preparedness and Response Program, as well as sound execution of National Environmental Policy Act requirements.

Overseas Drinking Water Program

NAVSEA has responsibilities outlined in CNICINST 5090.3, Navy Overseas Drinking Water Program Ashore, to support the Water Quality Oversight Council (WQOC) Laboratory Authority, which is charged with ensuring overseas installations are complying with water quality testing requirements. At the time of inspection, CNIC was routing a memorandum of agreement to formalize this arrangement with NAVSEA, since support to the WQOC had been informal. Additionally, paragraph 3.b.(1) of CNICINST 5090.3 specifies applicability to overseas installations, including installations under the command of NAVSEA. Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) on Andros Island, Bahamas, is under NAVSEA control and its drinking water system was recently added to the Overseas Drinking Water (ODW) Program in September 2015. While a reverse osmosis treatment plant provides drinking water for residents and employees onboard AUTEC, this system does not yet have a Certificate To Operate and does not comply with governing ODW instructions. A WQOC Sanitary Survey of AUTEC's ODW system is planned for fall of 2016 to determine the compliance of this system.

Deficiency 39. NAVSEA headquarters is not providing oversight of the overseas drinking water system at AUTEC. Reference: SECNAVINST 5040.3A, paragraph 9.f.(1).

Recommendation 34. That NAVSEA provide oversight of the drinking water system at AUTEC as that location works toward a Certificate To Operate. Reference: CNICINST 5090.3, Navy Overseas Drinking Water Program Ashore, paragraph 3b.

Energy Conservation

NAVSEA is compliant with SECNAVINST 4101.3, Department of the Navy Energy Program for Security and Independence Roles and Responsibilities, and OPNAVINST 4100.5E, Shore Energy Management. Furthermore, NAVSEA provides sound oversight and guidance of operational energy programs to subordinate echelons; however, we note that OPNAV N45 has been

working on echelon 1 guidance for several years, which has left echelon 2 commands without formal instruction regarding operational energy. We recommend that OPNAV N45 accelerate finalization and promulgation of this instruction to ensure alignment and clarify roles, responsibilities, and measures of effectiveness.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND CYBERSECURITY/TECHNOLOGY

The Security Programs and Cybersecurity/ Technology Team used survey and focus group responses, document review, and face-to-face interviews to assess the following areas:

- Insider Threat
- Information Security
- Personnel Security
- Industrial Security
- Physical Security and Antiterrorism/Force Protection
- Special Security Programs
- Operations Security
- Counterintelligence Training and Support
- Cybersecurity
- Personally Identifiable Information
- Foreign Disclosure

Command Security Overview

The NAVSEA Office of Security Programs and Continuity Planning (SEA 00P) is manned on a day-to-day basis with 21 civilian and 31 contractor personnel, consisting of the director (SEA 00P), the Security Operations Division (SEA 00P1), Policy Oversight/Inspections/Training Division (SEA 00P2), Information/Industrial Security Division (SEA 00P3), and the Technology Protection/International Security Division (SEA 00P5). At the time of the inspection, SEA 00P had three personnel vacancies. NAVSEA directorates and PEOs have Assistant Security Managers (ASM) who report to SEA 00P for security related matters. Of note, NAVSEA is supported by a Contract Security Guard (CSG) Force that is under the administrative control of SEA 00P1; the CSG is contracted by NAVFAC. The CSG Force is discussed further in the Physical Security and Antiterrorism Force Protection section of this report.

NAVSEA has several directives related to security functions; they are listed below:

- NAVSEAINST 5510.1B, NAVSEA Security Program Instruction
- NAVSEAINST 5510.19, NAVSEA Destruction and Disposal Policy
- NAVSEAINST 5510.2C (CH-1), NAVSEA Access and Movement Control
- NAVSEAINST 2200.1, NAVSEA Photographic, Audible Recording and Portable Electronic Devices Policy
- NAVSEAINST 2280.3A, NAVSEA Communications Security Program
- NAVSEAINST 3432.1, NAVSEA Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Instruction
- NAVSEAINST 3440.2, Naval Sea Systems Command Emergency Action Plan
- NAVSEAINST 3500.1A, Training Requirements for US Navy Reserve Personnel Assigned to Force Protection, Law Enforcement and Physical Security Billets Assigned to NAVSEA

Deficiency 40. The Command Security Manager is not indicated by name on organizational charts, telephone listings, rosters, or other media. References: SECNAV M 5510.30 Section 2-3, paragraph 4; SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2-2, paragraph 3.

Insider Threat

We examined NAVSEA's compliance with the DON Insider Threat Program (ITP), per SECNAVINST 5510.37, DON Insider Threat Program, Enclosure (3), paragraph 9. The day-to-day security performance, program compliance, and physical security readiness has challenges. The September 2013 active shooter incident highlighted the danger posed by an Insider Threat. NAVSEA made significant efforts to reconstitute its workforce into the refurbished headquarters building. However, it needs to establish integrated processes and procedures, and equip itself with the required tools to effectively identify and counter insider threats.

Information Security

The NAVSEA Information Security Program is not fully compliant with SECNAV M5510.36. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B, Naval Sea Systems Command Security Program Instruction, is NAVSEA's primary security directive used by command personnel. The instruction did not have all required information security elements of a command security instruction, as required by SECNAV M5510.36. NAVSEA does provide information security oversight of its lower echelon commands, as required by SECNAV M5510.36.

NAVSEA Emergency Action Plan (EAP), NAVSEAINST 3440.2 is compliant. The plan was approved in February 2015 and meets minimum requirements.

As part of the efforts to reconstitute the NAVSEA workforce and establish integrated processes and procedures, particular attention should be paid to the Top Secret Control Program to ensure compliance. NAVSEA had not conducted an inventory of its Top Secret Holdings in the 23 months leading up to the inspection. SECNAV M5510.36 requires that "Top Secret information shall be physically sighted or accounted for at least annually..." The NAVSEA Top Secret Control Officer turned over without conducting an inventory, contrary to SECNAV M5510.36. After we identified the deficiency, an inventory was conducted; NAVSEA accounted for all items.

NAVSEA employs the use of a Protected Distribution System (PDS) to route Secret Internet Protocol Router Network signals throughout building 197. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Visual inspections are required on the PDS (within 1 meter) at least once a day per United States Navy/United States Marine Corps IA PUB 5239-22, Information Assurance PDS Publication. [REDACTED] b7e

b7e

We observed inspection times and PDS lock serial numbers were not being recorded, contrary to IA PUB 5239-22.

Deficiency 41. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not adequately delineate unique command security requirements; it is an inadequate supplement to SECNAV M5510.36. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 1.

Deficiency 42. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not correctly identify the chain of command, to include the current NAVSEA security organization. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2b.

Deficiency 43. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not cite and append Security Service Agreements with subordinate commands, as applicable. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2d.

Deficiency 44. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not specify internal procedures for reporting and investigating loss, compromise, or other security discrepancies. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2f.

Deficiency 45. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B assigns responsibilities for security-related briefings and debriefings to SEA 00P1; SEA 00P2 actually performs this function. References: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2h; SECNAV M5510.30, Appendix C, paragraph 1b(3).

Deficiency 46. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not clearly state whether the commander or any other command officials have been delegated original classification authority. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2i.

Deficiency 47. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not clearly establish procedures for the review of classified information prepared in the command. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2j.

Deficiency 48. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not delineate command-specific classified reproduction controls. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2m.

Deficiency 49. Command-originated Security Classification Guides are not reviewed by the cognizant Original Classification Authority at the minimum prescribed review periodicities (every five years). Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 5-4.

Deficiency 50. NAVSEA does not ensure military and civilian personnel whose duties significantly involve the handling, creation, or management of classified information are documented on performance evaluations. References: DoDM 5200.01, Volume 1, Enclosure 2, paragraph 7h; SECNAV M5510.30, Section 2-2, paragraph 2k; SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2.1, paragraph 5h.

Deficiency 51. Activity Security Checklists (SF 701) and Security Container Check Sheets (SF 702) are not consistently used. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 7-11.

Deficiency 52. NAVSEA echelon 3 subordinate commands have not provided NAVSEA with self-inspection results. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 2-11.

Deficiency 53. None of NAVSEA's Open Storage Secret (OSS) spaces contain formal security in-depth determinations (risk assessments). Reference: DoDM 5200.01, Volume 3, Enclosure 3, paragraph 3b(3).

Deficiency 54. NAVSEA's Top Secret inventory log is missing a required element. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 7-3, paragraph 1.

Deficiency 55. [REDACTED] b7e

Deficiency 56. [REDACTED] b7e

Personnel Security

NAVSEA's Personnel Security program is not fully compliant with SECNAV M5510.30. NAVSEA does provide personnel security oversight of its lower echelon commands as required by SECNAV M5510.30.

NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not contain all Personnel Security elements of a Command Security Instruction, as required by SECNAV M5510.30. Specific missing items are stated in the deficiencies below.

We performed a spot check of IT Privileged User (IT-I) personnel at the NAVSEA headquarters and observed some personnel lacked the proper background investigation (a Single Scope Background Investigation, or SSBI), as required by SECNAV M5510.30. The spot check results and interviews with personnel suggests that SEA 00P and SEA 00I do not have a formal method to ensure all IT-I personnel at NAVSEA headquarters and across its enterprise have the correct background investigations.

Deficiency 57. [REDACTED] b7e

Deficiency 58. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not formulate guidelines for foreign travel briefings and has not identified the individual responsible to develop and conduct the briefing/debriefing. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Appendix C, paragraph 1b(6).

Deficiency 59. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not assign responsibilities for final preparation of investigation requests. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Appendix C, paragraph 1b(8).

Deficiency 60. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not establish procedures for documenting clearance and command access in JPAS. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Appendix C, paragraph 1b(9); and SECNAV M5510.30, Section 1-5, paragraph 15e.

Deficiency 61. Position sensitivity levels are not accurately reflected in numerous NAVSEA PDs. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Section 5-3, paragraphs 1a and 1b.

Deficiency 62. Some NAVSEA IT-I personnel do not have the required Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI), which is required for their positions, to include appropriate JPAS entries. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Exhibit 5A.

Deficiency 63. A total of 111 required Personnel Security Investigations for NAVSEA personnel were out of date. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program, Section 7-2, paragraphs 1c(2) and (3).

Deficiency 64. IT position level designations for all users at NAVSEA are not annotated within JPAS. Reference: SECNAV M5510.30, Section 5-2, paragraph 6.

Deficiency 65.

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Recommendation 35. That NAVSEA update its Command Security Instruction, NAVSEAINST 5510.2E, to document current policy and procedures for revocation and retrieval of Common Access Cards (CAC) from departing contractors, foreign nationals, and civilians.

Recommendation 36. That SEA 00P, SEA 00G, and SEA 010 review and correct civilian PDs for clearance and sensitivity determinations to include sensitivity designation letters.

Recommendation 37. That SEA 00P, SEA 00G, and SEA 00I coordinate with SEA 010 to review JPAS records for command personnel and audit civilian PDs for accuracy.

Industrial Security

NAVSEA's Industrial Security Program is not fully compliant with SECNAV M5510.36. While NAVSEA performs effective industrial security functions, NAVSEA requires a comprehensive, formalized approach to ensure all security requirements are met for Contracts, Contract Security Classification Specification forms (DD 254), and training.

Deficiency 66. NAVSEA does not have command-specific industrial security processes formally codified in an Industrial Security Program directive. NAVSEAINST 5510.1B does not meet the requirements for Industrial Security instruction. References: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 11-1 and Exhibit 2A, paragraph 2k.

Deficiency 67. NAVSEA DD 254s do not include the requirement to include and support Counter Intelligence awareness reporting and training on all classified contracts. Reference: DoDI 5240.06, Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR), paragraph 2c.

Deficiency 68. Multiple DD 254s for classified contracts contain errors in blocks 10, 11 and 13. Most do not have OPSEC as a requirement and block 13 in many instances includes erroneous references. Reference: SECNAV M5510.36, Section 11-5, Exhibit 11A.

Deficiency 69. NAVSEA is not verifying contractor storage capabilities prior to authorizing release of classified information to the contractor. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 11-5, paragraph 1e.

Physical Security and Antiterrorism Force Protection

We conducted an assessment of NAVSEA's Physical Security (as required by OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2), Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program and Antiterrorism Force Protection (ATFP). Due to the large extent of our findings, our assessment is broken into several sub-sections:

- Overview
- Physical Security
- Building 197 challenges
- Contract Security Guard Force
- ATFP

Overview

NAVSEA's Physical Security Program [b7e] with OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2). [b7e]

[REDACTED]

NAVSEA's ATFP Program [b7e] with OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Navy Antiterrorism Program, and DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards. [b7e]

[REDACTED]

NAVSEA provides ATFP oversight of its lower echelon commands through the execution of AT Program Assessments. NAVSEA headquarters maintains oversight of 33 other sites and facilities worldwide and conducted IG inspections on seven of them in FY15.

Our Physical Security and ATFP inspection of NAVSEA spanned four buildings; 197, 201, 176, and 218, and the portions of buildings 21, 22, 33, and 36 that are occupied by NAVSEA; we did not inspect building 104 (Naval Reactors). We focused a majority of our efforts at building 197, the NAVSEA headquarters building. As described earlier, NAVSEA has a CSG Force that performs guard functions at buildings 197, 201, and 176.

Although all NAVSEA headquarters buildings are located within the fenced compound of the WNY, [b7e]

[REDACTED]

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We examined five past assessments/investigations done by external agencies since 2009 for NAVSEA (in particular, building 197) against our findings during this inspection. The external assessments are listed below:

- Physical Security Assist Visit, conducted in June 2009 by the NCIS Security Training Assistance Assessment Team
- Naval Inspector General Command Inspection of NAVSEA, conducted in 2010
- A Risk Assessment/Survey, conducted in December 2014 by NAVSEA Headquarters Security Department (SEA 00P)
- A Security Assessment, conducted in January 2015 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of the Chief Security Officer
- The Navy investigation stemming from an active shooter incident inside building 197 in September 2013 (Chapter 4)

The following findings are repeat findings from one of the five above documents.

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Physical Security

NAVSEA's Physical Security plan is not fully compliant with OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2). While NAVSEAINST 5510.2C (CH-1), NAVSEA Access and Movement Control, does provide access and movement control policy for headquarters and locations throughout the NAVSEA enterprise, it does not address guidance for restricted areas, equipment, training, and response. At the time of our inspection, a revision to the NAVSEA AT and Physical Security Plan was in draft.

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NAVSEAINST 5510.2C (CH-1) identifies the entire NAVSEA headquarters building (building 197) as a Level II Restricted Area; however, many spaces inside building 197 failed to meet the definition of a restricted area, as defined in OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2), Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program, and NTTP 3-07.2.3, Law Enforcement and Physical Security.

NSA Washington's list of NAVSEA's restricted areas does not match with NAVSEA's designations; this is contrary to OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2). We observed other NAVSEA buildings with restricted areas that are not documented. We recommend NAVSEA reevaluate all restricted areas at NAVSEA buildings against the restricted area definitions, then reconcile with NSA Washington to determine the optimal NSF response based on requirements and NAVSEA needs. The level of restricted areas is important, as it drives the minimum NSF response number and times to alarms and/or emergencies.

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NAVSEA does not have a formal Key and Lock Control Program regulation, contrary to OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2). A Key Control Officer (KCO) is designated in writing, the NAVSEA headquarters Security Department maintains a certified locksmith on staff, and the locksmith was aware of the requirement identified in OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2) for rotating all security padlocks/removable key cores annually (due in February 2016). NAVSEA performed a complete re-key of security locks as part of the building 197 renovation. The NAVSEA headquarters facilities department maintains a key machine for making duplicate keys for convenience, privacy, administrative, or personal use only (mostly furniture keys). All security keys are stamped 'Do Not Duplicate' and must be approved by the Security Director for duplication. We provided training and NCIS assistance to the KCO for ensuring minimum requirements are fully

addressed in the Key and Lock Control chapter of the draft AT/PS plan and for establishing proper policy and procedures.

The CSG Post Orders (POs) for NAVSEA headquarters do not contain all the required elements and approvals/reviews, as required by NTTP 3-07.2.3. Additionally, all POs are required to contain guidance on the use of force as outlined in DoDD 5210.56, Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Building 197 Challenges

Building 197 received physical security upgrades during the renovation following the 2013 active shooter incident. The DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings required by UFC 4-010-01, did not apply because the total cost of renovation did not exceed 50 percent or greater of the building Plant Replacement Value (PRV). The PRV on record in November 2013 was \$178,616,012. The project cost for building 197, excluding ATRP measures, was \$38,420,000, which was 21.5 percent of the PRV. Four million dollars of the total renovation cost was spent on (1) creation of a new main entrance near the river; (2) relocation of the entrance on Isaac Hull Avenue; (3) repairs and modifications to security infrastructure inside building 197; and (4) pass-through turnstiles at the entrances.

A Ready-For-Issue (RFI) safe, located inside the NAVSEA headquarters ACC in building 197, is not compliant. An RFI safe is defined in OPNAVINST 5530.13C, Department of the Navy Physical Security Instruction for Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) as a relatively small amount of weapons and ammunition for duty section police, security guards, and response forces so that they are available for ready access. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The NAVSEA ACC [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED] All NAVSEA IDS alarms and CCTV cameras are monitored in the ACC, which is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by CSGs. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NAVSEA should re-evaluate its Security-in-Depth scheme at building 197, [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

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While not required, we recommend NAVSEA pursue remote alarm capability at the ACC for all “exit only” doors at building 197 due to the proximity of the building to both off base and to the power plant area west of the building. None of the doors used primarily for emergency exit had working local audible alarms or door alarms monitored at the ACC. NAVSEA Security submitted a work order to repair/replace/install all IDS alarms on exterior emergency exit doors (including roof doors/hatches) for buildings 197, 176, 201, and 218. If approved, this project will install a local alarm on each door, along with having remote alarm display and interrogation capability at the ACC.

Although there are no critical assets within building 197 that mandate CCTV, NAVSEA has 163 CCTV cameras installed, of which 20 are mounted on the exterior of their buildings. Prior to the active shooter event in September 2013, NAVSEA maintained 158 interior and exterior CCTV cameras. Post event, 17 internal cameras were moved to alternate NAVSEA locations and 5 cameras were added to the exterior of building 197.

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At the time of the inspection, NAVSEA CCTV video feeds could only be viewed at the ACC. A project was recently completed to provide a “client” CCTV monitoring station (slave unit) inside the NSA Washington Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This alternate capability enables the EOC to monitor all the NAVSEA CCTV cameras (on a single monitor) with the ability to select individual cameras for display and operate the Pan-Tilt-Zoom functions on those equipped. This initiative was a direct result of the after-action-report of the September 2013 active shooter event, where the NSA Washington EOC could not observe what was occurring inside building 197 for tactical control.

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Contract Security Guard Force

Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) contracted HBC Management Services to provide NAVSEA CSG services. We observed shortfalls in the oversight by both NAVFAC and NAVSEA of the CSG, [REDACTED] b7e [REDACTED].

NAVFAC provides some oversight of the CSGs via a NAVFAC Performance Assessment Representative (PAR); this requirement is mandated in the CSG contract. We reviewed four months of PAR assessments on CSGs assigned to NAVSEA. Four CSGs were assessed in August 2015; no CSGs were assessed in September 2015; 13-CSGs were assessed in October 2015, and 8-CSGs were assessed in November 2015. We observed no evidence of NAVSEA oversight of the CSG in their spaces, [REDACTED] b7e [REDACTED].

The PAR's level of inspection is not comprehensive due to lack of inspections of CSG Force day-to-day operations. The PAR conducts an administrative records check to verify individual CSG required qualifications (weapon, CPR, First Aid, and Baton) and has a face-to-face conversation with a CSG to discuss their logbook entries and check their professional appearance. The PAR does not conduct LOK checks or training with the CSGs. The PAR documents the performance assessment on a Performance Assessment Worksheet, which is provided to the COR. Unsatisfactory assessments are forwarded to HBC Management Services by the COR, and corrective action is required within 24 hours.

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Several CSGs stated they had received only minimum training to execute their responsibilities. Besides weapons training, other areas where only minimum training was administered include standard operating procedures (SOPs), PPRs, and knowledge of command specific rules, regulations, and policy.

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Recent implementation of CNICINST 3502.2, Navy Security Force Shore Training Manual, inadvertently removed the CNICINST 5530.14A requirement that all contract security guards must successfully complete a training program prior to assignment to duties utilizing the Navy Security Guard Training Course (NSGTC) (S-540-1012). Our engagement with the Naval District Washington (NDW) Regional Security Office and CNIC N3AT confirm that the removal of the CSG training requirement was a mistake and a future revision to CNICINST 3502.2 will correct this deficiency. In the meantime, NDW intends to send all HBC Management Services CSG personnel to a Regional Training Academy during FY16, which will satisfy S-540-1012 course requirements.

Antiterrorism Force Protection

NAVSEAINST C3300.2, NAVSEA Antiterrorism Plan does not address all required AT program elements identified in DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, Standard 7 (AT Plan). AT Physical Security Measures, Terrorism Incident Response Measures (TIRMs) and Terrorist Consequence Management Measures (TCMMs) for probable threats and AT Measures for Critical Asset Security are not addressed. A new revision of the NAVSEA AT and Physical Security plan is in draft.

Required individual AT Level I training is being conducted and tracked annually, and all new hires receive this training within 30 days as part of the NAVSEA “on-boarding” process, per DoDI 2000.16 (CH-2). The NAVSEA Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) attended the ATO Level II course of instruction in August 2014 and complies with DoDI 2000.16 (CH-2).

NAVSEA conducts RAM, as required by DoDI 2000.16. However, we observed errors in the RAM schedule and policy letter. NAVSEA promulgated a RAM policy letter in October 2015 directing NAVSEA headquarters to conduct RAM, providing 11 FPCON measures (Alpha – Delta) which were to be employed. The policy letter directs FPCON ALPHA and BRAVO measures, which should have already been conducted per U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) Force Protection (FP) Directive Message 15-233. The NAVSEA RAM schedule was not signed/approved by the Commander,

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Site-specific FPCON measures linked to AT measures and physical security actions have been developed by NAVSEA and are addressed in to NAVSEAINST C3300.2. [REDACTED] b7e measures are incorrectly aligned with the Baseline DoD FPCONs identified in DoDI 2000.16 (CH-2). Current NAVSEA FPCONs were aligned with DoD O-2000.12-H (DoD Handbook), which was cancelled by the DoD ATO Guide in 2012.

AT training and exercises are not being conducted at NAVSEA. DoDI 2000.16 (CH-2) states, "The ATO shall develop an annual training and exercise program to provide the necessary individual and collective training to prepare for the annual exercise." This instruction further states, "An AT plan will not be considered complete unless signed and exercised." USFF conducts an annual capstone AT exercise (Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield) for commands within their operational responsibility (which includes NAVSEA); however, it exercises only portions of AT and does not meet this requirement as a stand-alone exercise.

Deficiency 70. The NAVSEA AT plan does not address all required program elements. Reference: DoDI 2000.16, DoD AT Standards, Standard 7 (AT Plan).

Deficiency 71. The NAVSEA AT plan has not been fully exercised, making it incomplete. References: DoDI 2000.16, DoD AT Standards, Standard 7 (AT Plan) and Standard 23 (AT Training and Exercises); Navy Security Operations Exercise Program.

Deficiency 72. [REDACTED] b7e

Deficiency 73. The NAVSEA RAM Program is not addressed in the NAVSEA AT plan and has no established SOPs. Reference: DoDI 2000.16 (CH-2), Standard 14.

Deficiency 74. [REDACTED] b7e

Deficiency 75. NAVSEA does not have a formally codified key and lock control program in place. Reference: OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2), Enclosure (1), Article 0209, paragraph a(1).

Deficiency 76. NAVSEA has not appropriately posted its designated restricted areas on the outside of its buildings. References: OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2), Enclosure (1), Article 0210, paragraph g(6); NTTP 3-07.2.3, Appendix W, Section W.1.

Deficiency 77. NAVSEA designated restricted areas do not match the list of designated restricted areas provided to NSA Washington and requires reconciliation. Reference: OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2), Enclosure (1), Article 0210, paragraph g(2).

Deficiency 78. [REDACTED] b7e

Deficiency 79. CSG Post Orders do not address all requirements and were not approved.
Reference: NTTP 3-07.2.3, Appendix S, Section S.1, paragraphs 1 and 2.

Deficiency 80. CSG Post Orders do not contain guidance on the use of force. Reference: DoDD 5210.56, Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities, Enclosure 3, paragraph 4b.

Deficiency 81. [REDACTED] b7e
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Deficiency 82. [REDACTED] b7e
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[REDACTED]
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Deficiency 83. [REDACTED] b7e
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Deficiency 84. [REDACTED] b7e
[REDACTED]
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Recommendation 38. That NAVSEA upgrade and employ equipment available to enhance personnel and property inspections (i.e. metal detectors, etc.) at building ingress points.

Recommendation 39. That NAVSEA revise NAVSEAINST 5510.2C (CH-1) to reflect actual access control practices in place at NAVSEA buildings.

Recommendation 40. That NAVSEA coordinate with NAVFAC to require the NAVFAC PAR to conduct LOK interviews with NAVFAC CSGs as a requirement for conducting performance assessments.

Recommendation 41. That NAVSEA develop site-specific SOPs and PPRs for assigned CSGs and submit to NAVFAC for review and final approval by the Required Security Officer.

Recommendation 42. That NAVSEA coordinate with an outside organization to conduct an independent audit of the CSG contract to verify contractor and government compliance.

Recommendation 43. That NAVSEA evaluate internal CCTV coverage at its buildings and where there are gaps in coverage; consider installing additional cameras to enhance law enforcement surveillance capabilities.

Recommendation 44. That NAVSEA re-evaluate activation of access controls between floors in building 197 as a means to enhance Security-In-Depth for OSS and other sensitive spaces.

Special Security Programs

NAVSEA's Special Security Programs were assessed as compliant. A certified SCIF Inspector from Special Security Officer, Navy (SSO Navy) conducted a formal SCIF inspection. The results of the SSO Navy SCIF inspection were reported to NAVSEA separately via a formal Naval Message.

NAVSEA's Special Security Office (SEA 00G) is manned with seven civilians and one support contractor. SEA 00G has a Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) who is also the SSO, with an Assistant SSO, a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Liaison Officer (STILO), a Facility Security Officer, a Classified Contracts Officer, a Personnel Security Officer, a receptionist/visit coordinator, and a contractor who is a network manager. NAVSEA has 920 SCI billets, comprised of civilian, military, and contractor personnel. There are NAVSEA subordinate commands that maintain their own Special Security Offices.

We performed a five percent crosscheck of personnel records during the course of this inspection. We observed one personnel record of an SCI-indoctrinated employee with a potentially adverse, disqualifying entry with no documented resolution.

NAVSEA had one security violation in the past five years with zero documented Practices Dangerous to Security (PDS) reported. We reviewed the security violation; the lesson learned from that event could be sanitized and incorporated into the command's overall Security Education Program.

Based on our findings in Personnel Security where we observed numerous position sensitivity discrepancies for IT-I users, we interviewed the SSO staff at NAVSEA to determine their process to ensure proper position sensitivities are captured both in JPAS and civilian PDs. We observed that the SSO does not routinely collaborate with SEA 10 (Human Resources) to ensure that SCI billets have the proper coding in their PD.

Deficiency 85. NAVSEA SIO is also designated as the SSO. Reference: DoDM 5105.21, DoD SCI Administrative Security Manual, Volume 1, Enclosure 2, paragraph 6.

Recommendation 45. That NAVSEA audit its civilian SCI billets against PDs and JPAS to ensure the correct position sensitivities are reflected.

Recommendation 46. That NAVSEA (SEA 00G and 00P) develop a collaborative process to share common lessons learned as part of NAVSEA headquarters overall security education program.

Operations Security

NAVSEA's OPSEC Program is not compliant with OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Operations Security. NAVSEA has a properly trained and qualified OPSEC Program Manager who provides oversight over subordinate programs, CILs, and managers. The Command's instruction was signed in 2008, and does not account for subsequent DoD and/or Navy policies.

NAVSEA's OPSEC Program Manager provides oversight over content of training, but administration, delivery, and documentation of the training is the responsibility of the command training officer.

As an echelon 2 command with major worldwide responsibilities and services, NAVSEA meets the requirements of a Level III OPSEC Program, as defined in DoD 5205.02-M, DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual. Due to the required level of oversight of its subordinate units and/or the sensitivity of the mission, this program requires substantial effort to maintain an effective, day-to-day enterprise OPSEC effort, which should be synchronized with NAVSEA's customers and subordinate commands. However, the OPSEC Program Manager also has other significant command security responsibilities, and is only able to dedicate approximately 10 percent of his time to OPSEC.

NAVSEA did not have a commander-approved CIL, as required by DoDM 5205.02-M. The CIL should provide the NAVSEA workforce, contractors and subordinate commands unclassified, but sensitive information that, if compromised, could endanger national security or security of DON personnel and families at Navy Installations.

NAVSEA did not review contracts for OPSEC elements (as appropriate), and only provided virtual (vice onsite) reviews of subordinate command OPSEC Programs. The OPSEC Program manager has developed appropriate templates, language, and processes for OPSEC provisions in contracts, but application of OPSEC provisions in contracts is inconsistent. For example, we observed during our review of classified contracts that all of the DD254s had block 11j (In performing this contract, the contractor will have operations security requirements) annotated as "NO" which means there are no OPSEC requirements, when OPSEC requirements were applicable. SEA 00P3 (Industrial Security) could not provide an explanation regarding origin of this policy. Contributing to this, NAVSEA has no formal industrial security policy from which to perform formal, repeatable processes.

Additionally, NAVSEA maintains cognizance over a number of capabilities, facilities, and programs, which conduct sensitive high priority research and development. The complexity of the programs and responsibilities requires a high degree of attention from the headquarters OPSEC Program Manager.

OPSEC is incorporated into the public release process. The OPSEC Program Manager is included in review of technical material and official public releases. However, inclusion of the OPSEC Program Manager is not documented in either the relevant command routing sheet or NAVSEAINST 5230.12A, Release of Information to the Public. The NAVSEA Public Affairs Officer (PAO) routinely coordinates with the OPSEC Program Manager, and both ensure the relevant subject matter expertise is considered in rendering public release decisions.

Deficiency 86. NAVSEA's OPSEC Instruction is not compliant with governing directives.

Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 5n.

Deficiency 87. The NAVSEA OPSEC Program does not exercise or evaluate through regular assessments. Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 5f.

Deficiency 88. NAVSEA OPSEC Officer does not formally review contracts for OPSEC requirements to ensure classified and unclassified contract requirements properly reflect OPSEC responsibilities in contracts, where applicable. References: DoDM 5205.02-M, Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual, Enclosure 6, paragraph 1a; OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Operations Security, Enclosure (1), paragraph 5d.

Deficiency 89. On several occasions, NAVSEA DD254s incorrectly indicated that there were no OPSEC requirements. Reference: DoDM 5205.02-M, Enclosure 6, paragraph 2c.

Deficiency 90. NAVSEA had not promulgated a commander-approved CIL. References: DoDM 5205.02-M, Enclosure 3, paragraph 3a(2)(a); OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 5c.

Recommendation 47. That NAVSEA revise NAVSEA 5230.12A to include the OPSEC Program Manager in the public release process and to modify their public release review process to include the OPSEC Officer, the CSM, web administrators, PAO, and other officials designated by the commander, who also share responsibility for public release of information.

Recommendation 48. That NAVSEA expand attendance of the OPSEC working group to include the CSM, PAO, Contracting Officer, CORs, and Legal Officer.

Counterintelligence Training and Support

NAVSEA is not fully compliant with DoDD 5240.06, Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR).

Deficiency 91. Counterintelligence awareness training is not provided to personnel within 30 days of initial assignment or employment to NAVSEA and every 12 months thereafter. Reference: DoDD 5240.06, Enclosure 3, paragraph 3a.

Deficiency 92. Records for the completion of CI awareness training at NAVSEA do not contain all the required elements. Reference: DoDD 5240.06, Enclosure 3, paragraph 3d.

Deficiency 93. CI awareness training records at NAVSEA are not maintained for five years. Reference: DoDD 5240.06, Enclosure 3, paragraph 3e.

Cybersecurity

NAVSEA's Cybersecurity Program is not compliant. While NAVSEA has a dedicated IT staff (SEA 00I), positions are not categorized and coded with the correct Cybersecurity Data Element, to include all positions within the Information Technology Management, 2210 occupational series, as required by DON Chief Information Officer Memorandum of 8 April 2015, Coding of Department of the Navy Positions Performing Cybersecurity Functions.

SEA 00I does not perform oversight to NAVSEA's lower echelon commands. They have delegated this responsibility to NSWC Carderock, an echelon 4 command. The NAVSEA oversight arrangement we observed is contrary to SECNAVINST 5239.20, Department of the

Navy Cybersecurity/Information Assurance Workforce Management, Oversight, and Compliance, paragraph 6h(3), which requires the command's Chief Information Officer (CIO) to provide oversight for the command Information Assurance Workplace Improvement Program, and conduct assist visits or inspections to ensure unit level cybersecurity/IA Workforce management compliance.

Further, the command does not properly manage and account for all Information Systems under NAVSEA cognizance. All Afloat, Ashore, Program of Record (POR), and Centrally Managed Program systems are required to be registered in the Vulnerability Remediation Asset Manager (VRAM) with Assured Compliance Assessment Solution scans uploaded monthly. A spot check of VRAM revealed that a high percentage of NAVSEA systems are not registered in VRAM to include direct claimant commands' systems. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Deficiency 94. NAVSEA (SEA 00I) IT staff does not perform oversight of lower echelon commands. References: SECNAVINST 5239.20, paragraph 6h(3).

Deficiency 95. NAVSEA cybersecurity personnel are performing cybersecurity functions without the required certifications. Reference: DoD 8570.01-M, Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program, Chapter 4, Section C4.2.3.

Deficiency 96. The NAVSEA Enterprise Information Technology Officer is in an Information Technology (IT) Specialist (Series 2210) billet, but is not certified as a member of the Cybersecurity Workforce (CSWF). Reference: DoD 8570.01-M, Chapter 4, Section C4.2.3.

Deficiency 97. NAVSEA personnel performing cybersecurity functions are not all categorized and coded with the Cybersecurity Data Element, to include all positions within the Information Technology Management 2210 Occupation series. References: United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Special Cybersecurity Project of July 8, 2013; DON CIO memorandum of 08 April 2015, Enclosure (1), paragraph 6b.

Deficiency 98. NAVSEA personnel outside of SEA 00I are performing privileged user functions without required certifications or a privileged access agreement on file. Reference: DoD 8570.01-M, Section C2.1.4.

Deficiency 99. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Deficiency 100. SEA 00I does not have an Acceptable Use Policy for all Portable Electronic Devices. Reference: DON CIO Message, DTG: 031648Z Oct 11, Subject: Acceptable Use Policy for Department of the Navy (DON) Information Technology (IT) Resources, paragraph 6.

Deficiency 101. NAVSEA does not properly manage and account for all Information Systems under NAVSEA cognizance. Reference: CTF 1010 message, DTG 201810ZJAN15, Subj:

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Deficiency 102. NAVSEA does not properly provide adequate IAVM for all Information Systems under NAVSEA cognizance. Reference: CTF 1010 message, DTG 201810ZJAN15, Subj: CTO 15-01, paragraph 5.

Deficiency 103.

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Deficiency 104.

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Deficiency 105.

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Personally Identifiable Information

NAVSEA's Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Program is not fully compliant. The Privacy Program does not contain all elements required by SECNAV Instruction 5211.5E, Department of the Navy (DON) Privacy Program.

A significant number of shredders at NAVSEA do not meet the minimum standards for the destruction for PII. SECNAVINST 5211.5E states disposed PII records must be rendered unrecognizable or beyond reconstruction. During our walk-through of workspaces, we observed PII shred material in a common room that was not crosscut and did not meet the minimum standards for destruction.

NAVSEA should evaluate the need to have a dedicated full-time PII coordinator to sustain and provide oversight to the NAVSEA headquarters and enterprise.

Deficiency 106. NAVSEA does not track annual PII training for civilian employees or contractors at the headquarters. Reference: ALNAV 070/07, Department of the Navy (DON) Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Annual Training Policy, Paragraph 1a.

Deficiency 107. NAVSEAINST 5211.2A does not contain all required elements of a PII instruction. SECNAVINST 5211.5E, Department of the Navy (DON) Privacy Program, paragraph 7h(7) and paragraph 30c.

Deficiency 108. NAVSEA lacks an active Privacy Act Team (PAT). Reference: SECNAVINST 5211.5E, paragraph 30a (2).

Deficiency 109. Multiple shredders at NAVSEA are inadequate for PII destruction. Reference: SECNAVINST 5211.5E, paragraph 8b (1).

Deficiency 110. Not all command shredders meet minimum requirements for destruction of Controlled Unclassified Information to include For Official Use Only. References: DoDM 5200.01, Volume 4, DoD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), Enclosure 3, paragraph 2e(5); SECNAV M-5510.36, Sections 10-18 and 10-20.

Deficiency 111. NAVSEA does not maintain an auditable record of PII semi-annual spot checks conducted at the headquarters. Reference: ALNAV 070/07, Department of the Navy (DON) Personally Identifiable.

Recommendation 49. That NAVSEA evaluate the need to have a dedicated full-time PII coordinator to sustain and provide oversight to the NAVSEA headquarters and enterprise.

Foreign Disclosure

NAVSEA Foreign Disclosure Program is compliant with Foreign Disclosure Program, as required by SECNAVINST 5510.34A, Disclosure of Classified Military Information and Controlled Unclassified Information to Foreign Governments, International Organizations, and Foreign Representatives. NAVSEA SEA 00P5 has three full-time civilian Foreign Disclosure Officers, one of which is dedicated to processing and approving Foreign Visits. SEA 00P5 has cognizance over foreign disclosure and visit approval authority for the NAVSEA enterprise including associated PEOs and PMSs along with 24 field activities of varying size and responsibility. In FY15, SEA 005P adjudicated over 600 foreign release requests, coordinated over 200 export license reviews, approved 1300 foreign visits to locations across the enterprise and actively participated in the development/update of 23 DON system or technology policies.

Commander, NAVSEA took direct interest in SEA 00P5 foreign disclosure operations because of a September 2015 letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs) to all Navy SYSCOMs and PEOs regarding Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure. There is a proposal to increase staffing for NAVSEA foreign disclosure efforts. We concur that increased staffing is beneficial to continued compliance.

SEA 00P5 records their foreign disclosure decisions in a password protected spreadsheet that is regularly archived. SEA 00P5 has a goal to expand record keeping to include pertinent details of the decision or determination to assist in follow-on reviews and other requests for information on previously rendered decisions.

Research Technology Protection

Research Technology Protection (RTP) is not fully compliant with RTP and Program Protection Plans (PPP) guidance. There is a the lack of DON holistic technology protection and PPP implementation guidance for a recently promulgated Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) instruction and memorandum which is creating ambiguity about over-arching technology protection integration, oversight, application, and implementation over the entire program or system life cycle.

NAVSEA 00P5 staffing level appear to be adequate for supporting PPP development, but does not allow for active oversight and inspections to ensure all required training is conducted, PPP countermeasures are being implemented correctly, and no breaches or loss of technology has occurred. There is no DON guidance or instruction requiring active oversight and inspections; the reliance on contractor self-reporting without active oversight and inspections represents a risk to technology protection.

Issue Paper A-4 addresses this issue in further detail.

One NCIS billet at NAVSEA, assigned to work Research, Development, and Acquisition (RD&A) issues, has been gapped since September 2015. A relief is identified, but will not report until the March-May 2016 timeframe. NCIS, RD&A, and Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) staffing levels remain a concern from previous SYSCOM command inspections. There are 10 permanently dedicated analyst positions at NCIS Headquarters that support RTP (6-billeted RD&A analysts and 4-billeted SCRM analysts). Vacant analyst billets include three SCRM analysts. While 10 total analysts is an overall increase from staffing levels observed in 2012, the lack of dedicated analysts may be creating a backlog of RTP analytical production support required by DoD and DON guidelines and guidance.

Deficiency 112. RTP is not compliant with DoD 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; DoD 5200.39, Critical Information Identification and Protection Within Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; DoD 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Systems to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks; DoDI 8510.01, SECNAVINST 5000.2E, Department of the Navy implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems, ASN(RD&A) memorandum, and DASN RRDT&E memorandum.

Deficiency 113. Fifteen ACAT II and below level programs lack a PPP or a memorandum stating that the program does not contain Critical Program Information (CPI) and mission-critical functions and components. References: DoDI 5000.02 and DASN RDT&E memorandum.

Deficiency 114. There is no formal documentation within the PPP process to show SEA 00P5 concurrence with individual program PPP. Reference: PPP Concurrence and Approval Authority Matrix attached to 09FEB12 DASN(RDT&E) DON Implementation of PPP Memo.

Recommendation 50. In accordance with milestone decision requirement timelines, each Program Office Protection Lead, in coordination with RTP Security Personnel (SEA 00P5),

ensure a PPP or memorandum stating that the program does not contain CPI and mission-critical functions and components, is developed and submitted.

Recommendation 51. That NAVSEA add SEA 00P5 concurrence signature block to PPP signature page.

Recommendation 52. That NAVSEA establish an instruction outlining the information, content, and submission procedures that NCIS requires for conducting RDA and SCRM analysis. This is a best business practice observed at other SYSCOMs and has resulted in quicker delivery of requested analytical products.

Intelligence Support to Acquisitions

We observed that intelligence support to acquisitions was compliant. The NAVINSGEN Intelligence Team conducted fact-gathering face-to-face interviews of the NAVSEA Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)/STILO, assistant, a sampling of his customers in the program offices, and the main points of contact at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and NCIS. In the process, we reviewed documentation from NAVSEA, selected PEOs, ONI, NCIS, and other entities, providing a glimpse into the intelligence support cycle for NAVSEA customers.

The NAVSEA SIO/STILO Office, as with all Naval SYSCOMs, is unable to rely exclusively upon OPNAVINST 3880.6A, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Liaison Officer (STILO) Program and Intelligence Support for the Naval Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, and Acquisition Communities, for mission guidance. This instruction has not been revised to reflect updated higher level guidance; OPNAVINST 3811.1E, Threat Support to the Defense Acquisition System; SECNAVINST 5000.2E, DON Implementation of Defense Acquisition System, and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; CJCSI 3170.01I, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; and OUSD(AT&L) Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0. Issue Paper A-5 addresses this issue in further detail.

Despite the continued higher level policy developments in this area, the NAVSEA SIO/STILO Office remains the primary action office tasking the Intelligence Community (IC), through ONI, for support to NAVSEA acquisitions programs. As OUSD(AT&L)'s Better Buying Power 3.0 (BBP 3.0) envisions a more robust acquisition, intelligence and requirements (AIR) integration throughout a program's lifecycle, the NAVSEA SIO/STILO has developed an organizational realignment plan, which is designed to preserve its traditional SIO/STILO responsibilities in this emerging more streamlined, dynamic and integrated acquisitions environment. To meet the BBP 3.0 action of continuously monitoring Critical Intelligence Parameters throughout a program's lifecycle, the NAVSEA SIO/STILO must move toward a model where the PEOs will fund an Assistant STILO to service their respective programs. Such a model is already functioning with Naval Reactors (SEA 08). The NAVSEA SIO/STILO has proposed an organizational realignment plan with PEO-funded Assistant STILOs in the following areas: IWS, SUBS, SHIPS, and CYBER (2X).

Recommendation 53. That NAVSEA SIO/STILO Office develops a metrics-based tracking system to capture its collective work output across the NAVSEA enterprise.

Recommendation 54. That NAVSEA SIO/STILO Office should be moved into building 197 to facilitate closer working relationships between STILOs and their assigned program offices.

Recommendation 55. That NAVSEA adopt the SIO/STILO organizational realignment plan.

Intelligence Oversight

Intelligence Oversight (IO) is not fully compliant. NAVSEA does not require a command-wide IO program because it is not an intelligence component or element thereof. However, SECNAVINST 3820.3E does apply since the NAVSEA STILO is involved in several intelligence-related activities. For example, the NAVSEA SIO/STILO oversee University Affiliated Research Centers' contracts, which include research and development for Intelligence Community sponsors.

Deficiency 115. The NAVSEA SIO/STILO Office has not fully implemented procedures to properly identify and vet IO concerns within the scope of its intelligence-related activities. SECNAVINST 3820.3E, p. 2, paragraph 4; OPNAVINST 3880.6A, p. 4-6, paragraph 5.d.1-16.

Recommendation 56. That NAVSEA SIO/STILO Office personnel complete basic IO training.

Recommendation 57. That the NAVSEA SIO/STILO, supported by the NAVSEA Legal Office, develop tailored IO training for staff directly involved with intelligence-related activities.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

The Resource Management Team assessed 21 programs and functions. Our findings reflect inputs from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, direct observation, and face-to-face personnel interviews.

The following programs and functions are considered to be well administered and in full compliance with applicable directives:

- Casualty Assistance Calls Officer
- Command Individual Augmentee Coordinator
- Command Managed Equal Opportunity
- Comptroller/Financial/Contract Management
- Government Travel Charge Card
- Government Commercial Purchase Card
- Hazing Training and Compliance
- Individual Medical Readiness
- Managers' Internal Controls
- Physical Readiness Program
- Deployment Health Assessment
- Urinalysis Program Coordinator

The following programs were found to be not compliant or not fully compliant:

Inspector General Functions

NAVSEA Inspector General Functions were not compliant. While the Command Inspection and Audit Liaison programs are compliant, the Hotline Program is not in compliance with SECNAVINST 5370.5B, DON Hotline Program. Timelines for Hotline Program preliminary inquiries, referrals and dismissals and full investigations are not being met. The NAVSEA IG provides oversight of echelon 3 activities, and conducts weekly case reviews and training as well as an investigator certification program to improve the quality of investigations.

Deficiency 116. The NAVSEA IG is not meeting the 30-day completion timeline for all preliminary inquiries as required by NAVINSGEN Policy Memorandum Number 2013 – 001.

Deficiency 117. The NAVSEA IG is not meeting the 30-day completion timeline for all Referrals and Dismissals as established by NAVINSGEN Policy Memorandum Number 2013 – 001.

Deficiency 118. NAVSEA IG is not meeting the 90 day completion timeline for all full investigations as established by SECNAVINST 5370.5B.

Freedom of Information Act

The NAVSEA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program is not compliant due to a large backlog of nearly 500 FOIA requests. NAVSEA headquarters receives 15 to 20 new FOIA requests per week. Most requests relate to contracts, which are usually very large, require

subject matter experts in preparing a response, and require coordination with contractors; they are extremely time consuming. There are still 12 cases in process from 2011. The backlog is attributed to a reduction in personnel from six to four, the WNY shooting when NAVSEA lost access to many of its records for an extended period, and the Navy's adoption of FOIA Online ("FOL"). DONCIO policy requires the use of FOL, but NAVSEA is also using its own tracking system to manage its FOIA work and satisfy NAVSEA reporting requirements, thus doubling the tracking workload for the staff.

Deficiency 119. NAVSEA FOIA Program is not in compliance with FOIA response time requirements as set forth in SECNAVINST 5720.42F, DON FOIA Program, Section 11.a.(2), which is explained in DOJ FOIA Manual, page 16, FOIA Requests: Response Time.

Recommendation 58. Accept DNS-36 offer to conduct a Lean Six Sigma review of the NAVSEA FOIA process to identify choke points and other process weaknesses.

Issue Paper A-6 addresses the FOIA issue in further detail.

Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention

Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention is not fully compliant. The Alcohol Drug Control Officer (ADCO) actively monitors the NAVSEA alcohol and drug abuse prevention programs. Sailors are provided education, training, and awareness on alcohol and drug abuse prevention at a minimum of twice per year. OPNAVINST 5350.4D, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, states that for echelon 2 commands the person assigned ADCO duties should serve in this capacity as their primary duty; the NAVSEA ADCO position is a collateral duty.

Deficiency 120. The NAVSEA ADCO is assigned as a collateral duty when this should be a full time duty for echelon 2 and 3 commands. Reference: OPNAVINST 5350.4D, paragraph 8m(1).

Personal Property Management

NAVSEA is not in compliance with DoD and DON personal property policies and procedures. There is no objective evidence that NAVSEA has had an active Personal Property Program at the headquarters since 2012. The previous Personal Property Manager (PPM) retired in 2012, and from 2012 until recently, the position was gapped. The current PPM was assigned in writing in November 2015. There are no personal property custodians assigned to the headquarters, no established procedures for custodian turnover, and there is no inventory plan. Although coordination with the Government Purchase Card Agency Program Coordinator is underway, there is no linkage between PPM and procurement. NAVSEA's current local instruction is under revision to incorporate latest program requirements.

Deficiency 121. A personal property custodian has not been assigned to NAVSEA headquarters. References: SECNAVINST 7320.10A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 3(c); SECNAVINST 5200.42, Enclosure 2, paragraph 3(e), and 4(b).

Deficiency 122. Inventory plans have not been established at NAVSEA headquarters. References: DoD Instruction 5000.64, Enclosure 3, paragraph 11; SECNAVINST 7320.10A, Enclosure 1, paragraph 4(b)(2)(a), paragraph 4(b)(2)(f) and paragraph 7 (d)(3).

Deficiency 123. Inventories are not being conducted at NAVSEA headquarters. References: DoDI 5000.64, Enclosure 3, paragraph 11; SECNAVINST 7320.10A, Enclosure 1, paragraph 7(d)(1).

Deficiency 124. NAVSEA headquarters has no codified process to link acquisition and Personal Property Management. References: DoDI 5000.64, Enclosure 2, paragraph 2; DoD Regulation 7000.14-R Volume 4, Chapter 6, paragraph 060104; SECNAVINST 7320.10A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 7(a) and paragraph 2(d)(1)(d).

Records Management

NAVSEA's Records Management Program is not fully compliant. The long delay in updating its Command Document Management System (CDMS) with a DoD 5015.2-STD compliant Electronic Records Management Application (ERMA) plug-in has created a culture of non-compliance for the retention and preservation of electronic record material. This puts the command at-risk in complying with 44 U.S.C. The Federal Records Act, and SECNAVINST 5210.8D, Department of the Navy Records Management Program. This also places the command at-risk for non-compliance with FOIA and other electronic discovery responsibilities due to the lack of an effective electronic records management program. Additionally, NAVSEA is not fully compliant with ensuring that all records are captured and preserved prior to staff departing the command. Currently, records management is only part of the check-in process, not the checkout process, which has the higher risk. Several deficiencies and recommendations were identified and continued improvement requires senior leadership involvement.

Deficiency 125. NAVSEA is not operating a compliant electronic records management program. Reference: SECNAVINST 5210.8D, paragraph 13 and 14.

Deficiency 126. NAVSEA is not fully compliant with controlling the life cycle of electronic record material. Reference: OPNAVINST 5210.20, paragraph 1.b.

Deficiency 127. Currently only parts of NAVSEA (Naval Warfare Centers) are operating with an approved DoD 5015.2-STD ERMA (TRIM). Reference: OPNAVINST 5210.20, paragraph 8a.

Deficiency 128. NAVSEA is not compliant with the management of its serialized correspondence within CDMS. Reference: SECNAV M-5210.2, Introduction, paragraph 1 and Ch. 2, paragraph 1.

Deficiency 129. NAVSEA is not fully compliant with the out-processing of its staff and ensuring all records are captured and preserved prior to staff departing the command. Reference: OPNAVINST 5210.20, paragraph 18.

Recommendation 59. That NAVSEA should implement its Open-Text Records Management Plug-in and conduct training on its use.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SAPR) at NAVSEA is not fully compliant. Our engagement with NAVSEA confirmed that the command is committed to maintaining an environment free of sexual assault and that victims would receive excellent care and support services. SAPR training is required for military and for civilians who supervise service members by DoDI 6495.02 CH-2, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures, SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response and OPNAVIST 1752.1C, Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program. This training has not been completed as required. FY15 training compliance ranged from zero percent for civilians and civilian supervisors of military to 57 percent for military service members. NAVSEA is on target to complete military training requirements in FY16.

Deficiency 130. SAPR training required for military, civilians, and for civilians who supervise service members has not been completed. References: DoDI 6496.02 CH-2, Enclosure (10), paragraphs 1b, 2, 3e and f; SECNAVINST 1752.4B, paragraph 8a (5), Enclosure (3), paragraph 2d; OPNAVINST 1752.1C, Chapter 2, paragraphs 1, 15ac, 22c, Appendix 2B (page 2B-3), and Chapter 10.

Recommendation 60. Recommend the SAPR Officer attends Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office training provided by OPNAV N17.

Recommendation 61. Recommend the SAPR Officer or Command SAPR point of contact provide all SAPR watch stander and Duty Officer training.

Suicide Prevention

The NAVSEA Suicide Prevention Program is not fully compliant. During our inspection, we observed that while some elements of an effective suicide prevention program were in place, several deficiencies and recommendations were identified. Suicide prevention training completion rates for FY14 were zero percent for military, civilians, and full-time contractors; training compliance was 54 percent for military, less than 1 percent for civilian staff, and we were unable to determine compliance for full-time contractors as required by OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program. NAVSEAINST 5350.3, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Suicide Prevention Program (SPP), dated 22 Aug 2011 requires updating to align with current policy. A crisis intervention plan needs to be established in order to support those who seek help, and take appropriate safety measures for those at high risk. NAVSEA has not designated in writing an Assistant Suicide Prevention Coordinator (SPC) and civilian SPC as required in its own instruction. Further, NAVSEA should provide oversight of subordinate echelon suicide prevention programs.

Deficiency 131. Required suicide prevention training for military, civilians, and full-time contractors has not been completed. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraph 5a(1), 6h(3), Enclosure 3, paragraph 1.

Deficiency 132. NAVSEA has not designated in writing an Assistant SPC and civilian SPC. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, 6h(2); NAVSEAINST 5350.3, paragraph 4b (1).

Deficiency 133. NAVSEAINST 5350.3 has not been reviewed and updated to ensure compliance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A

Deficiency 134. NAVSEA does not have a crisis intervention plan to support those who seek help, as required by OPNAVINST 1720.4A.

Recommendation 62. That NAVSEA provide programmatic oversight to subordinate echelon suicide prevention programs.

Transition Assistance

The NAVSEA Transition Assistance Management Program is not fully compliant. There are no documented Pre-Separation Counseling Checklists (DD Form 2648) or Service Member's Individual Transition Plan Checklists (DD Form 2958) in Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) systems, which affects Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) to Hire Heroes Act of 2011 compliance. However, NAVSEA did have paper copies, which the TAP Program Manager is in process of uploading into DMDC. NAVSEA did not maintain paper copies of DD2648/DD2648-1 on file for two years as required by OPNAVINST 1900.2B, 6.k.5.

Deficiency 135. NAVSEA is not meeting required standards for administration of the Transition Assistance Management Program IAW Chapter 58 of Title 10, United States Code, Sections 201-256 of Public Law 112-56 and Directive Type Memorandums (DTM) 12-007.

Deficiency 136. NAVSEA did not maintain paper copies of DD2648/DD2648-1 on file for two years. Reference: OPNAVINST 1900.2B, 6.k.5.

Recommendation 63. The assigned NCC is assigned as the SYSCOM Career Counselor; we recommend NAVSEA add a collateral duty career counselor to assist with these duties.

Recommendation 64. Schedule Transition Goals, Plans, and Success training with OPNAV N170.

Voting Assistance

NAVSEA's Voting Assistance Program is not fully compliant with DoDI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP).

Deficiency 137. NAVSEA does not have sufficient Unit Voting Assistance Officers (UVAOs) for the size of its staff.

Deficiency 138. NAVSEA has not established and maintained a standard email address, in the appropriate format, to contact all UVAOs. Reference: DoDI 1000.04, Enclosure (4), paragraph 2r.

SAILOR PROGRAMS

The NAVINSGEN Command Master Chief engaged various enlisted junior and senior leadership groups. Areas reviewed included the Command Sponsorship, Command Indoctrination, Career Development Programs, Sailor Recognition Program, and CPO 365. Separate meetings were held with key program managers to get a sense of the career management programs throughout the command. Brilliant on the Basics Programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was observed. Enlisted Sailors displayed proper military bearing and maintained a professional appearance.

Command Sponsorship Program

The Command Sponsorship Program is compliant with OPNAVINST 1740.3C, Command Sponsor and Indoctrination Programs. The command has a coordinator who assigns sponsors to inbound military staff members. The sponsor coordinator has developed a relationship with the Fleet and Family Support Center to provide the required training to Sailors prior to their assigned sponsorship duties. Currently there are no sponsor critique forms in place to determine the health of the program; however, there is a plan to develop a feedback mechanism that will be used to measure the strength of the program.

Command Indoctrination Program

The Command Indoctrination Program is not compliant with OPNAVINST 1740.3C. Due to the high level of civilian gains and the low number of military, the traditional Indoctrination Program does not exist at NAVSEA. The command utilizes the check-in sheet as a substitute for the required military training normally conducted in command indoctrination, and the coordinator holds each service member accountable for reviewing the Navy Pride and Professionalism training. Upon completion of the check-in process, training is documented appropriately.

Career Development Board

The NAVSEA Career Development Board (CDB) Program is compliant with OPNAVINST 1040.11D, Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Board. A rated Career Counselor is assigned and is scheduled, and required CDBs are scheduled. CDBs are in the process of being conducted at the command level and are attended by the chief of staff, command master chief, the first O6 in the member's chain of command, and their senior enlisted leaders. This process was approximately 30 percent complete at the time of the inspection, and was scheduled to continue until each enlisted member had a CDB, and then transition to the traditional CDB process to be completed at the Division/Department/Command level, as appropriate.

Sailor Recognition Programs

The Sailor of the Year Program is established in accordance with OPNAVINST 1700.10, Sailor of the Year Program, and was assessed to be satisfactory. There is a draft proposal for a NAVSEA Sailor of the Quarter Program that will be submitted for leadership's consideration.

CPO 365

CPO 365 participation is good within the Chief Petty Officer Mess. Phase I is off to a strong start and the concept of Leadership 365 is alive and well, displayed by a Yeoman second class participating in the most recent training. Petty Officers First Class and Chief Petty Officers participate with NSA Washington for CPO 365 Phase II.

NAVSEA Senior Enlisted Training Symposium

NAVSEA conducts an annual Senior Enlisted training symposium for the NAVSEA enterprise senior enlisted leadership. This yearly symposium offers a broad range of briefs on relevant topics presented by Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and Naval Reserve Force to name a few and is considered a best practice. What sets this program apart from others is the integration of training, theory, and the detailed questions and answers with regard to implementation of the Commander's Vision.

Appendix A: Issue Papers

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

Issue Papers that follow require responses to recommendations in the form of Implementation Status Reports (ISRs). If you are an Action Officer for a staff listed in Table A-1, please submit ISRs as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

- Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 1 October 2016. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. This report is distributed through Navy Taskers. ISRs should be submitted through the assigned document control number in Navy Taskers. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 is added to the original Navy Tasker Package along with the inspection report, upon distribution.
- Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.
- When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement "Action is considered complete" and should include documentation to substantiate that determination. However, NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.
- NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs is b6,b7c,k2

Table A-1. Action Officer Listing for Implementation Status Reports

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-15
NAVSEA	050-15, 052-15, 053-15, 054-15, 055-15, 056-15, 057-15, 058-15, 059-15, 060-15
NAVSAFECEN	051-15

ISSUE PAPER A-1: MISHAP RISK ASSESMENT MATRIX TAILORING

References: (a) DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System
 (b) NAVSEAINST 5000.8, Naval SYSCOM Risk Management Policy
 (c) MIL-STD-882 E, Department of Defense Standard Practice for System Safety

Issue: Formal Documentation of Tailored Mishap Risk Assessment Matrices

Background: Assessing and documenting risk is a major element in the system safety process. References (a) and (b) provide guidance on establishing, implementing, and executing system safety engineering for acquisition programs. Reference (c) outlines the standard DoD practice for system safety and includes detailed guidance on how to assess and document mishap risk by utilizing pre-determined mishap probability categories and probability levels. In accordance with the standard, any tailoring to mishap risk matrices requires formal approval by a DoD component.

Discussion: On several Acquisition Category acquisition programs, SEA 05 utilizes tailored system safety risk matrices. Since NAVSEA acquires ships that can carry up to several thousand people, the consequences of ship loss greatly exceed the consequence categories defined in MIL-STD-882 E. The SEA 05 tailored system safety matrices include the following definitions with increased dollar thresholds and unique probability levels:

- Severity Definitions
 - CVN Loss (1) - Could result in CVN destruction beyond reasonable repair or sinking, or damage exceeding \$5,000,000,000.
 - Ship Loss (2) - Could result in Navy Ship or Submarine destruction beyond reasonable repair or sinking; or damage exceeding \$500,000,000 but less than \$5,000,000,000.
 - Significant (5) – Could result in permanent partial disability/occupational illness not requiring medical discharge; or injury/illness resulting in 10 or more lost work days; or damage exceeding \$500,00 but less than \$5,000,000; or significant environmental damage.
- Probability Levels
 - Infrequent - (D) Qualitative-Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur; Quantitative - ≥ 1 Event Per 10,000 Total System Units
 - Rare - (E) Qualitative - Unlikely, but may occur rarely;

Quantitative ≥ 1 Event Per 100,000 Total System Units.

These modified SEA 05 severity and probability definitions have been effective in accounting for greater consequences; however, there is no formal approval in place as required by reference (c) to authorize the use of the tailored system safety matrices.

Recommendation: 050-15. That NAVSEA, in coordination with the Naval Safety Center, update NAVSEAINST 5000.8 policy to include requirements that standardize the use of the tailored system safety risk matrices and attain formal approval from the appropriate authority to utilize the tailored system safety risk matrices.

NAVINGEN POC:

b6,b7c,k2

ISSUE PAPER A-2: FEEDBACK FROM SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS TO
ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS MANAGERS

References: (a) DoDI 5000.02
(b) SECNAVINST 5000.2E
(c) SECNAVINST 5100.10K
(d) OPNAVINST 5100.23

Issue: Safety and occupational health staffs at subordinate commands do not commonly participate in acquisition oversight or effectively direct their findings to product, commodity managers, and technical authorities with the resources and responsibility for making corrective actions. This gap is associated with a lack of training and guidance related to operation of the defense acquisition system in general and specifically details of the complex NAVSEA processes. It is also consistent with lack of staffing and time focused in this area.

Background: There is limited OPNAV/SECNAV guidance directing acquisition and logistics training for safety and health personnel. This is inconsistent with the intent of references (a) through (d), along with the current focus on life-cycle cost and risk management throughout the acquisition life cycle, and requirements for implementation of safety management systems. Furthermore, industrial hygiene reports tend not to identify key deficiencies to the relevant technical authorities, or suggest changes in the Field Operations Manual to facilitate improved communication.

Discussion: Day-to-day knowledge regarding potential design limitations that may increase the cost and risk of maintenance can be most apparent to those providing safety oversight in depot and operational settings. The integrated process team approach endorsed by DoD and required for NAVSEA acquisition programs by NAVSEAINST 5100.12B would greatly benefit from participation of shipyard SOH personnel.

Recommendation: 051-15. That Naval Safety Center coordinate with NAVSEA to update OPNAVINST 5100.23 CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual, Chapter 3, Organization and Staffing, and Chapter 5, Prevention and Control of Workplace Hazards.

NAVINSGEN POC:

b6,b7c,k2

ISSUE PAPER A-3: NAVSEA ANTITERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION

- References:
- (a) NTP 3-07.2.3, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Law Enforcement and Physical Security
 - (b) OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-2), Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program
 - (c) Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 13-005, Deviations from the DoD Physical Security Program (CH-3)
 - (d) DoDI 5200.08, Security of DoD Installations and Resources
 - (e) NAVSEAINST C3300.2, Antiterrorism Plan
 - (f) DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards
 - (g) USFF Message DTG 211842ZAUG15, Subj: USFF Force Protection (FP) Directive Message 15-233.
 - (h) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings
 - (i) CNICINST 5530.14A, CNIC Short Protection Program

Issues: [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Background: CSGs are utilized to perform guard duties at NAVSEA buildings, to include building 197 in lieu of Naval Security Force (NSF) personnel from NSA Washington. [REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b7e

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] b7e
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- We observed that NAVSEA's FPCON measures addressed in reference (e), Appendix D are not aligned with DoD Standards or U.S. Fleet Forces guidelines; this is contrary to reference (f), AT Standard 22 and reference (g), paragraph 1a.

- [REDACTED] b7e [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b7e [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Discussion: We observed that CSG orders for building 197 are inadequate and not aligned with NSA Washington ECP guard orders. [REDACTED] b7e [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b7e [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] .

Recommendations: 052-15. That NAVSEA coordinate with NSA Washington to audit and make required adjustments to CSG orders at NAVSEA to align efforts with installation guard orders.

053-15. [REDACTED] b7e [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

054-15. [REDACTED] b7e
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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055-15. [REDACTED] b7e
[REDACTED]
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NAVINGEN POC: [REDACTED] b6,b7c,k2
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

ISSUE PAPER A-4: DON GUIDANCE FOR RESEARCH TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION

References: (a) DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System
 (b) OUSD(AT&L) Better Buying Power 3.0 White Paper
 (c) DoDI 5200.39, Critical Program Information (CPI) Identification and Protection Within Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
 (d) DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN)
 (e) DoDI 8510.01, Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT)
 (f) DoDI 5240.02, Counterintelligence (CI)
 (g) SECNAVINST 5000.2E, Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

Issue: The Department of Navy (DON) lacks implementation guidance for references (a) and (f).

Background: In 2014 and 2015, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) issued references (a) and (b) to increase the productivity, efficiency and effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition, technology, and logistics efforts. Additionally, references (c) through (g), which support research, development, and acquisition technology protection, have been updated within the last three years.

Discussion: While there have been a number of memorandums and various working groups established over the last several years to address aspects of the changes in references (a) through (g), there is no DON-wide instruction, integrating all required stakeholders, addressing how to implement new DoD acquisition and technology protection policy and guidelines. The lack of DON holistic technology protection and Program Protection Plans (PPP) implementation guidance for the recently promulgated DoD Instructions, White Paper, and memorandums is creating ambiguity at DON Systems Command level about over-arching technology protection integration, oversight, application, and implementation over the entire program or system life cycle.

Recommendation: 056-15. That NAVSEA coordinate with ASN(RD&A), Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy) (DUSN(P)), and OPNAV N2/N6 to update SECNAVINST 5000.2E to reflect changes in references (a) through (g) and provide holistic technology protection and PPP implementation guidance.

NAVINGEN POC:

b6,b7c,k2

ISSUE PAPER A-5: DON GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO ACQUISITIONS

References: (a) OPNAVINST 3880.6A
(b) OPNAVINST 3811.1E
(c) DoDI 5000.02
(d) OUSD(AT&L) Better Buying Power 3.0 White Paper

Issue: References (c) and (d) require more frequent and timely intelligence support to acquisitions.

Background: In reviewing NAVSEA's Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)/Scientific and Technical Intelligence Liaison Officer (STILO) role and work related to intelligence support to acquisitions, there is a clear disconnect between the STILO responsibilities outlined in reference (a), and the comprehensive lifecycle acquisition intelligence support improvements envisioned in references (c) and (d).

Discussion: Since references (a) and (b) were published, DoD guidance has been updated and increased the intelligence support to acquisitions requirements. The higher-level guidance calls for an expanded NAVSEA STILO role; however, DON-level guidance is either out-of-date or unclear on how individual STILOs are to integrate with the intelligence community and provide the required wide-ranging support. For example, the DON does not have a standard way to research, review, submit, prioritize, and track critical intelligence parameters. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued references (c) and (d) to increase the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of DoD acquisition, technology, and logistics efforts. Relevant and timely intelligence is a key aspect of improving acquisition efficiency and effectiveness. To meet the increased intelligence demand signal properly, DON STILO Program responsibilities and guidance requires update.

Recommendation: 057-15. That NAVSEA coordinate with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)), Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy) (DUSN(P)), ONI-Farragut Technical Analysis Center, NAVAIR, and SPAWAR to update OPNAVINST 3811.1E and OPNAVINST 3880.6A to reflect changes and expanded intelligence roles in references (c) and (d).

NAVINGEN POC:

b6,b7c,k2

ISSUE PAPER A-6: NAVSEA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

References: (a) SECNAVINST 5720.42F, DON Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) Program, 16 Jan 99
(b) Department of Justice Handbook for Agency Annual Freedom of Information Act Reports, 29 Oct 13

Issue: The NAVSEA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program is not meeting processing time requirements set forth in governing Navy Instructions.

Background: Reference (a) implements the FOIA within the Department of the Navy (DON). It establishes a general requirement that FOIA requests be answered in 20 working days from the date the request is “perfected.” Reference (b) provides direction on when the FOIA processing clock starts, specifically stating it starts upon receipt of a “perfected FOIA request.” A perfected request is one in which the requester agrees to pay processing fees, includes an address and adequately identifies the requested document. It also offers further direction by stating that there is a presumption that a request is perfected upon its receipt.

Discussion: NAVSEA has a significant FOIA backlog; 496 cases were pending at the time of the inspection. The typical FOIA request that NAVSEA receives is for a contract, which tends to be a very large, complex document, the redaction of which requires subject matter experts (from within the NAVSEA Codes) and consultation with the contractor - a time consuming process. NAVSEA headquarters receives on average 288 FOIA requests per year. At the time of the inspection, NAVSEA had 12 FOIA requests pending from 2011.

The DON, on 1 February 2014, mandated the Navy wide use of FOIA ONLINE (FOL). FOL is a digital program designed to accept requests, create correspondence, store files, and generate response letters to requesters. It is also designed to provide end of the year reports to the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Navy’s via DoD) required of all federal agencies. Prior to FOL, NAVSEA used a locally developed FOIA tracking program.

NAVSEA FOIA asserts several factors contribute to its backlog of FOIA cases; mandated use of FOL, the issue of when a request is “perfected,” time spent at the end of each fiscal year gathering data required by DNS-36 for its submission of the Navy’s annual FOIA report to DoD, reduction in staff from 6 to 4 employees, delays caused by office dislocation, which resulted in no access to requested records for over a year. Associated

with the perceived shortcomings in FOL, particularly in its failure to generate metrics required by the command, NAVSEA FOIA continues to maintain, in parallel, the legacy tracking system. DON chose FOL and requires all Navy activities to use it. The data FOL generates through its annual report is the data DoD requires, which is also the data the DOJ requires from all federal agencies regarding FOIA.

NAVSEA FOIA is further in arrears than reflected in its numbers because it does not use the correct starting time upon receipt of FOIA requests. Both references (a) and (b) indicate the FOIA processing clock starts upon receipt of a “perfected FOIA request” and reference (b) clearly states that there is a presumption that a request is perfected. FOL affords the receiving activity 10 days to review the request and return it to the requester for action to “perfect it.” Failure of an activity to take that action in 10 days results in the clock automatically starting. DONCIO indicated that the NAVSEA position that the clock does not start until the request is perfected, even if the initial review of the request to determine if it is perfect is outside of 10 days is incorrect.

DONCIO indicated that because of a large backlog of FOIA responses, not just at NAVSEA but throughout the Navy, the Naval Audit Service will audit the Navy FOIA program. Additionally, the National Archivists Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) is also going to audit the Navy’s FOIA Program.

DNS-36 recognizes that there are issues with FOL. Notwithstanding, DNS-36 indicated that NAVSEA FOIA would greatly benefit from a Lean Six Sigma type review of its process and has volunteered to conduct such a review. A step-by-step review of the NAVSEA FOIA process, as suggested by DNS-36, is critical to identifying choke points and eliminating them. The NAVSEA backlog is substantial and beyond the ability of four employees to reduce significantly if they continue to use the same process and receive no additional help. .

Recommendations: 058-15. That NAVSEA accept the DNS-36 offer to conduct a Lean Six Sigma review of the NAVSEA FOIA process to identify choke points and other process weaknesses.

059-15. That NAVSEA terminate the legacy system and apply the savings to hiring additional personnel.

060-15. That NAVSEA explore the possibility of detailing trained personnel, including Reserve support, to the FOIA office to reduce the backlog.

061-15. That NAVSEA consider contracting administrative support to the FOIA office, which would free up the staff to do substantive FOIA work.

062-15. That NAVSEA accept DONCIO's offer to provide more FOL training.

NAVINGEN POC:

b6,b7c,k2

Appendix B: Summary of Key Survey Results

PRE-EVENT SURVEY

In support of the NAVSEA Command Inspection held from 30 November to 11 December 2015, NAVINSGEN conducted an anonymous online survey of active duty military and DON civilian personnel from 1 October to 6 November 2015. The survey produced 747 respondents (32 military, 715 civilian). According to reported demographics, the sample represented the NAVSEA workforce with a 2.91 percent margin of error at the 95 percent confidence level. Of note, there were no respondents who self-identified as GS 1-8. Selected topics are summarized in the sections below. A frequency report is provided in Appendix D.

Quality of Life

Quality of life was assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The overall NAVSEA average quality of work life (QOWL), 6.81, was slightly higher than the historical echelon 2 average, 6.67 (Figure B-1). The overall NAVSEA average quality of home life (QOHL), 8.34, was higher than historical echelon 2 average, 7.95 (Figure B-2).

The perceived impact of factors on the QOWL rating is summarized in Table B-1. Factors of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20 percent negative responses served as a baseline. Five factors listed in Table B-1 were significantly higher overall than this baseline. Civilian respondents identified quality of workplace facilities as a negative impact on QOWL more often than the military respondents (see highlighted percentages in the “Military” and “Civilian” columns of Table B-1). While Leadership Support overall was not significantly higher than the 20 percent baseline, civilian respondents more often identified Leadership Support as a negative impact on QOWL than military respondents (see highlighted percentages in the Military and Civilian columns of Table B-1).

Although “Leadership Support” overall may not have been significantly higher than the baseline, the follow-on question asked those respondents who reported a negative to elaborate on their response. The dominant theme expressed was a general lack of guidance provided by their leadership. This is best summarized by one participant’s statement that “It’s an extremely fast paced sink or swim environment.” Some respondents mentioned the lack of leadership skills displayed by their first line supervisors, which included comments on communication, role definition, and accepting inputs from staff.

The “Awards and Recognition” factor also included a follow-up question for those who reported a negative impact. The main themes included favoritism, equity of awards, and the importance their supervisor placed on the awards program. The theme for favoritism was best summed by this comment “...there seems to be a ‘good old boys/girls’ rewards program...”

“Cost of Living” (46 percent of all respondents) was the only QOHL factor that was significantly negative. Overall, participants had a positive response.

Other notable results from the survey; 199 comments were made concerning NAVSEA facilities; 38 comments concerning parking; and 28 comments concerning telework, all of which indicated negative impact on their QOWL. Facilities comments varied to include concerns about cleanliness of restrooms, break rooms, and work areas; temperature of workspace; malfunction of facilities such as toilets and sinks; lack of paper goods; and infestation of rodents and cockroaches. The dominate theme among those who commented on telework was a general wish for an increase in the opportunity to telework. Comments concerning parking mainly centered on the lack of availability.

Lastly, though there was not a specific theme to the comments, the 2013 tragedy that occurred at NAVSEA at the WNY was expressed in comments in various contexts such as security concerns or remarks regarding awards and recognition.

Mission Tools and Resources

Table B-2 lists aggregate strongly disagree and disagree response percentages to survey questions probing the adequacy of tools and resources that support the mission. Items of potential concern were identified by distributional analyses, where 20 percent negative responses served as a baseline. There were two areas where a significant percentage of respondents reported inadequacies in resources; people (29 percent) and software (28 percent). No other percentages listed in Table B-2 were significantly different from the 20 percent baseline.

Job Importance and Workplace Behaviors

Table B-3 shows other items that respondents reported were impacts to QOWL. Most notable was a significant percentage of respondents that reported they perceived they did not have adequate time to complete required training (35 percent); frequently or always work more hours than they report (34 percent); and report the civilian recruitment process is not responsive (33 percent). There were several factors that respondents reported were significantly positive. Most notable are the military and civilian relationship. Only 2 percent of the respondents reported a negative impact on QOWL. For more positive factors, see Table B-3.




Figure B-1. Distribution of QOWL from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.




Figure B-2. Distribution of QOWL ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for ratings are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Table B-1. Negative Impacts on Quality of Work Life Rating

Factor	Overall	Military	Civilian	Male	Female
Job satisfaction	11%	9%	11%	9%	12%
Leadership support	20%	6%	21%	20%	21%
Leadership opportunities	19%	9%	19%	19%	19%
Workload	24%	13%	25%	24%	23%
Work hours/schedule	12%	13%	12%	12%	11%
Advancement opportunities	24%	9%	24%	22%	26%
Awards and recognition	27%	13%	27%	26%	29%
Training opportunities	14%	6%	14%	16%	12%
Command morale	25%	16%	25%	23%	29%
Command climate	20%	13%	21%	19%	24%
Quality of workplace facilities	23%	6%	24%	24%	21%

Notes. Perceived impact of assessed factors on QOWL rating based on negative versus aggregate positive and neutral response. Low percentages are "better." Overall values in bold are significantly different than a 20% baseline; higher values in bold indicate significant differences between subgroups.

Table B-2. Tools and Resources to Accomplish the Mission

Items	Inadequate	Other
People	29%	71%
Training	19%	81%
Workspace	17%	83%
Computer	20%	80%
Software	28%	72%
Internet	17%	83%
Intranet	15%	85%
Equipment	16%	84%
Materials & supplies	17%	83%

Notes. Aggregate strongly disagree and disagree (Inadequate) response percentages to perceptions on the adequacy of mission tools and resources. Smaller percentages are "better." Inadequate percentages in bold are significantly different than a 20 percent baseline.

Table B-3. Other Items That Respondents Reported Significantly Impacts QOWL

Item	%	Responses
Mil-Civ work well together.	2	SD+D
Concerned about my safety.	5	SD+D
EO program is effective.	6	SD+D
Performance evaluations have been fair.	7	SD+D
Communication down the COC is effective.	22	SD+D
Communication up the COC is effective.	25	SD+D
DON civ recruitment process is responsive.	33	SD+D
Work more hours than I report.	34	Frequently + Always
Adequate time to complete required training.	35	SD+D

Notes: Factors above the dotted line are positive impacts. Response type: Frequently or Always indicates the frequency rating. SD+D indicate the degree respondents Strongly Disagreed or Disagreed with a statement. Smaller percentages are “better.” All the above were significantly different from 20% baseline.

Appendix C: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions

FOCUS GROUPS

From 20 November to 2 December 2015, NAVINSGEN conducted focus groups with various active duty military (31) and civilian personnel (64) for a total of 95 participants. Each focus group was scheduled for 60 minutes and included 1-facilitator and 2-note takers. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) NAVINSGEN personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) privacy, non-attribution, and basic ground rules statements, (d) participant-derived list of topics having the most impact on the mission, job performance, or quality of life (QOL), and (d) subsequent discussion of participant-derived topics with an emphasis on refinement and understanding of perceived impact. Note takers transcribed focus group proceedings, which were subsequently coded by the NAVINSGEN staff to protect the confidentiality of participants.

Table C-1 lists focus group topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, or QOL in at least two groups.

Table C-1. Participant-Derived Focus Group Topics Expressed as a Major Impact on the Mission, Job Performance, or Quality of Life.

Topic	Impact		
	Major	Moderate	Minor
Leadership	●●●●●	●	●
Parking	●●●●●	●●●●	
Internet/Corporate Tools	●●●	●●●●	●●
Manning/Manpower	●●●		
Acquisition/Procurement	●●	●	
Childcare Services	●●	●	●
Workload	●●	●●	
Telework	●●	●●	●
Policies/Process	●●	●	●

Notes. Descending order of the number of focus group topics that were expressed as a major impact on the mission, job performance, and/or QOL in at least two military or civilian focus groups; colored circles indicate active duty military (●) or civilian (●).

Leadership

Leadership was best characterized by the perception that civilian supervisors lack supervisory training and are more comfortable with the technical aspects of their job. Participants reported that supervisors are too busy to attend to issues such as training. Often, supervisors are reluctant to delegate work to their subordinates.

Military participants indicated that they may have multiple bosses and they are shuttled back and forth between them. In addition, sometimes tasks are issued by different supervisors at the same time with no clear direction which project may take precedence. Another military group reported that civilians did not want to be trained by the military member as they [Military members] prepared to PCS. Another military participant expressed positive accolades on his/her leadership, feeling they receive great support when they needed it.

Civilian participants from one group indicated that NAVSEA leadership does not exhibit concern for how employees are dealing with the shooting incident. While another group of civilians expressed accolades specifically to Commander, NAVSEA. They felt proud of the Admiral. He “brought us together after the shooting tragedy. He still offers opportunities for people to talk.” Civilian participants also related how some direct supervisors are not passing down work and not putting in the effort to develop them as future leaders of NAVSEA.

Parking

Parking concerns seemed to be a consistent theme discussed both in the pre-event survey as well as in the focus groups. Parking was especially troubling for those employees who have children in daycare and cannot arrive early enough to find parking. The shuttle from L’Enfant Plaza Metro was recognized as an improvement for Metro commuters. Personnel also reported that they appreciate the Smart Benefit Program giving them an alternative to driving and dealing with the parking issue. Participants perceived that half of the parking is reserved for red spaces. Attending meetings off the base during the day posed a unique problem; participants explained that they could not find parking when returning from the Pentagon, Walter Reed, or other locations. Most reported that they telework on those days or take leave the rest of the day. The shuttle between the WNY and Pentagon only runs on the hour until 1500. Participants explained that this was often times inconvenient, especially if the meeting runs late. Many participants reported that they knowingly park illegally sometimes and accept the consequences of being towed or ticketed. Participants reported that parking adds to the daily stress of working at NAVSEA. A few even went as far to say that parking contributes to the decisions of personnel not accepting promotions to WNY, retention of employees, and morale.

Internet/Corporate Tools

Participants discussed their issues with NMCI and computer hardware. One group mentioned submitting tickets for work on their computer and not getting a response back until 2200. In addition, they explained they have received reports from NMCI that a problem was fixed when it was not. Others reported not being able to open Adobe PDF files necessary for them to complete their work. They blamed this on incomplete software refreshes. Another problem discussed was the inability to access information from technical manuals. One person reported that they call the shipyards to get copies of old NAVSEA documents because they are no longer available on the shared drive as result of a local 3-year archive rule. Other discussions referred to how old NAVSEA technology is compared to industry. One participant said that the backup of data is not done and leaves them vulnerable to hard drives going bad with no way to retrieve data. Another participant reported that the IT support person is often hard to find. Lastly, a participant reported that the video conferencing quality is inefficient.

Manning/Manpower, Hiring Process, and Workload

Manning/Manpower, Hiring Process, and Workload, three related concerns, was best summed up by a comment made by one of the participants, “Working on the whack-a-mole staff replacement model.” Staff members are replaced, and then others leave. This effect increases the workload. Participants perceived an upcoming wave of retirements that will only increase the workload.

Participants reported that some billets remained vacant for up to a year or more, and that the hiring process just takes too long. Further, they expressed that qualified candidates may not wait that long for a job and may take another opportunity rather than wait out the hiring process. Participants expressed concerns about the USAJOBS screening process that relies on a computer program to conduct the screening. Qualified candidates that do not understand how to submit an online job application within the USAJOBS environment may be screened out. As a result, participants felt that they were losing qualified candidates through this screening process and getting the wrong people for interviews.

Another focus group discussed the manning issues concerning contracting functions. Continuing Resolutions (CR) are perceived as impacting contracting personnel. SEA 02 cannot keep experts on board, which results in a constant under manning of the function. Once personnel gain experience, they leave for other organizations. This results in delays in contracting, impacting the ability of the organization to meet mission.

Participants believe a direct result of these issues creates a high workload environment. Yet, they are not authorized overtime or compensatory time. While credit hours can be earned, many lose them due to workload requirements. Participants see the impact as major because deadlines are missed and they do not have time to follow-up on completed work, resulting in increased costs associated with problems found later in the process. Participants of one focus group believed that these issues also negatively impact retention. The participants reported that there many talented people working at the shipyards, but they do not want to come to D.C. One participant said that promotions are not worth all the hassles of working in D.C.

The underlying theme throughout the surveys and focus group discussions concerning Manning, Hiring Process, and Workload was that there is a culture at NAVSEA to work long hours, and sometimes weekends, to get the mission done. Yet, civilian personnel accept this because they seem to be committed to meeting NAVSEA’s mission.

Acquisition/Procurement

Participants discussed the impact of the current fiscal environment on contracting and acquisitions. Participants acknowledged that folks are stressed and experience difficulties finding and keeping talent. Participants felt that these issues are creating internal friction between Human Resources, Facilities, and Contracting. Additionally, budget cuts make it difficult to get things done. Personnel are forced to recalculate estimates and determine how to complete the contract with less money. A few comments follow: “We have requirements

and to get cheaper ships... This is continuing and will cause the Navy problems in the future.”
 “Cost minimizing leads to lower quality.” “...it wears people down.”

Childcare Services

Childcare was discussed in both civilians and military focus groups. Generally, participants discussed the difficulty getting into any of the areas Child Development Centers. There is a priority given first to military members on the base where the CDC is located; civilians are given the lowest priority. There are long waiting lists and the list for infants is even longer. Children are typically in daycare for about 12 hours starting at 0600 because of the commuting time. Those trying to use JBAB claim to add “about 2 hours” to their commute because of the traffic between WNY and JBAB. Those participants who discussed the childcare issue expressed a desire for WNY to have a CDC. They believe that it would greatly improve their quality of life and aid in retention of young talent.

Telework

Overall, telework was seen as a positive. Participants reported outstanding support from senior leadership. Telework was seen as a way to assist in easing parking issues. Some participants noted that the telework policy is not equally implemented across codes. Participants reported that some directors do not support telework and call it “taboo.” In addition, not all employees can telework due the lack of internet connections at home, and in some cases, not having a laptop. Those who used telework expressed a few negative comments about connectivity issues with NMCI. Most participants expressed the desire to telework more often, with some speculating that it may help with recruiting and retention.

Policies/Process

Discussions about external policies and processes focused on the various outside agencies that NAVSEA works with requests for data and information. Often, the same or similar data calls are requested, time away from the person’s ability to accomplish the mission. People frequently have to work off the clock to complete the mission requirements. Participants particularly pointed out that Congressional Budget inquiries negatively impact mission completion.

Travel rule changes are requiring people to stay in perceived “unsafe areas.” One person reported that they were required to stay in a hotel where they could “hear gunshots.” The changes to the long-term per diem rates and reduction for long-term duty are now making it difficult to get volunteers for the long-term assignments away from home. One supervisor now has to detail employees to meet mission requirements. “People are quitting because of the change.”

Internal Policies and Processes discussed included not having a standard onboarding process for new employees. Many processes are not standardized from Directorate to Directorate. An example provided by a participant was letter writing. Another group discussed Navy programs that are in place, but were not aware of guiding instructions, making it hard for them to find out who is in charge of the program (referring to Navy programs like DAPA, SAPR, and Resource Management functions).

Other Topics with Expressed Major Impact

Professional Knowledge & Development (1 Major, 2 Moderate).

Participants' discussions centered around two distinct areas. The first area of concern was annual training requirements and system type training. Participants perceived annual training to be repetitive year-to-year and generic in nature. Systems training, such as ERP, did not really teach them how to use the system. Participants said they had to learn on their own through trial and error. The common denominator for these discussions is best summed up by one participant who said, "They do not have time for training. There is no value added. When something prevents us from performing our core tasks, it is major."

The second area discussed was professional development. Participants conveyed that there is no consistent way of developing employees. One participant said "Hard as a new employee to find a path." They made comments such as "Need new employees to make an immediate impact." "We use them (new employees) without proper training." "It is difficult to work here. You have to be determined." "People get burned out when they churn and don't know how to do the job." "It is survival of the fittest." "Management is busy and does not have time to coach people." In addition to new employee development, supervisor development was a discussion point. The perception of participants is that there is a lack of supervisor training for both those who seek to become supervisors and those who have been promoted to supervisory positions. The perception is if you "stick around long enough and don't break anything, you'll rise up the ranks through attrition."

Mission (1 Major, 1 Moderate).

Discussions regarding the NAVSEA mission were generally positive. Participants said that working at NAVSEA is rewarding. They truly believe in the mission and want to be a part of the organization. Participants believe that the command does a good job communicating the mission. However, some tasks are not clear on how they relate to accomplishing the mission. Examples included "making the annual report" and "work in response to a request made by a friend of one of the admirals." Another participant said "walk-the-talk of strategic plan. We have these five pillars in the plan, but they are not being followed."

Accountability (1 Major, 0 Moderate).

This factor was discussed among the enlisted focus group participants; their comments were directed at civilians. Participants pointed out that one civilian sits at their desk and does nothing all day resulting in the enlisted picking up the slack. Another participant related that civilians protect their job, not assigning the military any responsibilities, which forces them to look around the whole code to find something to do. One individual said, "I feel useless, if I could, I would cancel my orders." Their perception is that civilians do not view NAVSEA as a military organization. One participant summed the discussion up with "Sailors are not a priority."

Funding (1 Major, 0 Moderate).

Participants discussed the impact of the CR on funding stability. There is hope that Congress will change to a two-year budget cycle.

Appendix D: Survey Response Frequency Report

Numerical values in the following tables summarize survey responses to forced-choice questions as counts and/or percentages (%). Response codes are listed below in the order that they appear.

SD Strongly Disagree

D Disagree

N Neither Agree nor Disagree...

A Agree

SA Strongly Agree

- Negative

N Neutral

+ Positive

N Never

R Rarely

S Sometimes

F Frequently

A Always

2015 COMMAND INSPECTION OF NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND

Military		Civilian	
Male	Female	Male	Female
27	5	448	267
4%	1%	60%	36%

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and the availability of opportunities for professional growth.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	12	30	46	32	67	67	143	195	102	53
%	1.61%	4.02%	6.16%	4.28%	8.97%	8.97%	19.14%	26.10%	13.65%	7.10%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOWL rating.

	+	N	-
Job satisfaction	68%	22%	11%
Leadership support	54%	26%	20%
Leadership opportunities	39%	42%	19%
Workload	38%	37%	24%
Work Hours/Schedule	65%	23%	12%
Advancement opportunities	38%	39%	24%
Awards and recognition	28%	45%	27%
Training opportunities	46%	40%	14%
Command morale	36%	39%	25%
Command climate	38%	41%	20%
Quality of workplace facilities	44%	33%	23%

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best), please rate your Quality of Home Life (QOHL). QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Count	6	2	10	16	29	27	70	172	200	215
%	0.80%	0.27%	1.34%	2.14%	3.88%	3.61%	9.37%	23.03%	26.77%	28.78%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOHL rating.

	+	N	-
Quality of home	83%	14%	3%
Quality of the school for dependent children	45%	50%	4%
Quality of the childcare available	27%	68%	6%
Shopping & dining opportunities	77%	20%	3%
Recreational opportunities	80%	17%	2%
Access to spouse employment	53%	41%	5%
Access to medical/dental care	80%	17%	3%
Cost of living	25%	29%	46%

My command gives me sufficient time during working hours to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	1	6	12	12
3%	3%	19%	38%	38%

My current workweek affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

SD	D	N	A	SA
1	4	2	13	12
3%	13%	6%	41%	38%

My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
42	77	90	349	157
6%	11%	13%	49%	22%

I work more hours than I report in a pay period because I cannot complete all assigned tasks during scheduled work hours.

N	R	S	F	A
96	124	253	162	80
13%	17%	35%	23%	11%

The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

My command is concerned about my safety.

SD	D	N	A	SA
14	24	84	387	238
2%	3%	11%	52%	32%

My command has a program in place to address potential safety issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
9	18	128	392	200
1%	2%	17%	52%	27%

My job is important and makes a contribution to my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
4	13	62	313	355
1%	2%	8%	42%	48%

SD	D	N	A	SA
44	88	435	133	15
6%	12%	61%	19%	2%

My (local) Human Resources Office provides timely, accurate responses to my queries.

SD	D	N	A	SA
41	90	389	160	35
6%	13%	54%	22%	5%

The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.

SD	D	N	A	SA
84	166	325	155	17
11%	22%	44%	21%	2%

During the last performance evaluation cycle, my supervisor provided me with feedback that enabled me to improve my performance before my formal performance appraisal/EVAL/FITREP.

SD	D	N	A	SA
50	87	158	248	109
8%	13%	24%	38%	17%

I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.

SD	D	N	A	SA
53	100	123	380	91
7%	13%	16%	51%	12%

_____ is occurring at my command.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
Fraternization	1%	2%	8%	42%	48%
Favoritism	8%	24%	56%	9%	2%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	5%	18%	39%	25%	13%
Sexual Harassment	16%	33%	42%	6%	3%
Race Discrimination	20%	37%	41%	2%	0%
Hazing	21%	34%	37%	6%	3%

The following tools and resources are adequate to accomplish the command's mission.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
People	7%	22%	13%	42%	15%
Training	4%	15%	20%	48%	13%
Workspace	4%	13%	19%	47%	17%
Computer	7%	13%	14%	47%	19%
Software	10%	18%	16%	41%	16%
Internet	5%	12%	16%	48%	18%
Intranet	4%	11%	24%	45%	16%
Equipment	3%	13%	22%	47%	15%
Materials & Supplies	5%	13%	25%	43%	15%

I have adequate leadership guidance to perform my job successfully.

SD	D	N	A	SA
43	71	136	317	180
6%	10%	18%	42%	24%

Communication down the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
53	114	157	325	98
7%	15%	21%	44%	13%

Communication up the chain of command is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
54	130	224	279	60
7%	17%	30%	37%	8%

My performance evaluations have been fair.

SD	D	N	A	SA
18	34	169	337	189
2%	5%	23%	45%	25%

The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.

SD	D	N	A	SA
55	104	276	236	76
7%	14%	37%	32%	10%

Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.

SD	D	N	A	SA
5	11	101	355	275
1%	1%	14%	48%	37%

My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity &

Command Managed Equal Opportunity) is effective.

SD	D	N	A	SA
18	29	354	245	101
2%	4%	47%	33%	14%

My command adequately protects my personal information.

SD	D	N	A	SA
47	66	239	300	95
6%	9%	32%	40%	13%

My superiors treat me with respect and consideration.

SD	D	N	A	SA
25	53	93	330	246
3%	7%	12%	44%	33%

My command attempts to resolve command climate issues.

SD	D	N	A	SA
22	60	250	322	93
3%	8%	33%	43%	12%

I have adequate time at work to complete required training.

SD	D	N	A	SA
70	191	120	312	54
9%	26%	16%	42%	7%

Do you supervise
Department of the Navy
(DON) civilians?

Yes	No
155	592
21%	79%

When did you receive civilian supervisory training?

<12mos	1-3 yrs	>3 yrs	Never
76	44	0	9
59%	34%	0%	7%